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A growing literature finds that large purchases of US Treasury debt by foreign in-
vestors lower Treasury yields. However, this literature does not adequately address
the endogeneity of foreign Treasury purchases to yields. The first two chapters of
this dissertation overcome this identification problem with two different methods and
therefore identify larger impacts of purchases than previous studies. The third chapter
improves the measurement of foreign Treasury purchases.
In the first chapter, I analyze the dynamic impacts of foreign Treasury purchases
on yields in the context of a sign-identified vector autoregression. In the baseline re-
sults, a surprise foreign purchase of $100 billion of US Treasury securities significantly
lowers all yields for approximately two years. The largest impacts occur after about
one year, with yields lower by 70 to 100 basis points. Additionally, I decompose long
rates, revealing that the Federal Reserve acts to lessen the impact of foreign pur-
chases, but not enough to offset large declines in term premia. My estimated effects
of purchases on yields are generally larger than those found elsewhere and indicate
both that foreign Treasury purchases explain the period of low rates in the 2000s and
that LSAPs have substantial impacts on yields.
The second chapter uses a novel measure of surprise foreign official Treasury pur-
chases, high frequency data, and the technique of identification by heteroskedasticity
to identify the effect of Chinese official purchases of US Treasury securities on yields.
The effects I estimate are statistically significant and on the same order of magnitude
as the lower frequency findings in the first chapter of the dissertation.
In the third chapter, I address shortcomings in the existing data on cross-border
Treasury flows. Sources of raw data are noisy, inconsistent, and available only at lower
ii
frequencies, while existing techniques for improving this data use a limited informa-
tion set. I estimate a new measure of net foreign Treasury flows as an unobserved state
variable using the Kalman filter, with raw flows data, yields, and exchange rates as
observables. The resulting time series of net flows addresses the above shortcomings
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CHAPTER 1
Foreign Treasury Purchases and the Yield Curve:
Evidence from a Sign-Identified Vector Autoregres-
sion
1.1 Introduction
In the mid-2000s, interest rates on long-term Treasury securities appeared unusually
and persistently low. As the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate in the second
half of 2004, long-term interest rates actually declined. As short rates rose, nominal
and real forward rates fell (Backus and Wright (2007)). This behavior seemed strange
given the historical behavior of the yield curve, and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan (2005) labeled it a “conundrum.” Moreover, this anomalous behavior was
only a particularly remarkable episode during a much longer period of oddly low
interest rates. Empirical studies tend to find that long-term Treasury yields were
unusually low given the state of the business cycle, the stance of monetary policy,
and inflation expectations through much of the 2000s. As a rule of thumb these
studies estimate that the yield on the 10-year note was perhaps 50-80 basis points
lower than might have been expected based on its historical behavior.
Of course, the mid-2000s were also a time when foreigners, especially the central
banks of emerging Asian economies, were buying large quantities of US debt. Some
policymakers, such as Bernanke (2005) and Greenspan himself, have suggested that
these large capital flows may be the cause of the “bond yield conundrum.” This
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explanation for the conundrum requires that the quantities of outstanding financial
assets exert substantial influence on the prices and yields of those assets. This topic
is doubly important given the large scale asset purchases undertaken by many central
banks in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Indeed, the motivation for such asset
purchase programs offered by many central bankers is precisely that by reducing the
outstanding quantity of financial assets, usually government debt, they expect to lower
yields. There is a growing literature studying the effects of Treasury purchases on
yields, whether the purchasers are foreigners or domestic central banks. However, this
literature faces a difficult econometric task in identifying the effects of the purchases.
This paper asks whether and to what extent foreign purchases of Treasury secu-
rities affect Treasury yields, and it does so in the context of a sign-identified vector
autoregression (VAR). The variables in the VAR are net foreign purchases of US
Treasury securities and the first three factors of the yield curve.
In the baseline results, I find that an exogenous purchase of $100 billion of Treasury
securities by foreigners in a single month significantly lowers Treasury yields across
the term structure for around two years following the purchases. As rough guide, the
1- and 5-year yields decline by perhaps 90 to 100 basis points, while the ten-year yield
declines by about 70 basis points, with the largest impacts coming a year or more
after the purchase.
Decomposing long-term interest rates into term premia and expected future short
rates, I find evidence that the Federal Reserve responds conservatively to foreign
purchases, allowing purchases to cause a significant loosening of credit conditions.
The responses of 5- and 10-year yields reflect a response of term premia which is
larger and more persistent than the response of yields overall, combined with a small
rise in the average of expected future short rates. The Fed does tighten policy in
response to the compression of term premia, but does not do so aggressively enough
to fully offset the impacts of the purchases on yields. By failing to prevent a loosening
2
of credit conditions in response to large foreign purchases of US financial securities,
the Fed might allow asset price bubbles to grow. This assertion is at least consistent
with the fact that the US experienced a bubble in a sector known to be very sensitive
to long-term interest rates (real estate) in the mid-2000s; the mid-2000s were also a
period of large foreign purchases of US securities and oddly low long rates.
The fundamental obstacle in identifying the effects of foreign Treasury purchases
on yields is that foreign Treasury purchases are endogenous to yields. Clearly, private
foreign Treasury purchases are endogenous to yields; private investors make their
Treasury purchases with the price or yield of the securities in mind. Any reasonable
theory of portfolio allocation would suggest they should. In spite of this fact, no
existing studies have addressed the endogeneity of private foreign purchases. Where
private purchases have been considered, they have been assumed to be exogenous to
yields, for the lack of a credible identification method.
Foreign official purchases of Treasuries are also endogenous. Survey and anecdotal
evidence suggests that official reserve managers behave in much the same manner as
private investors, engaging in optimal portfolio allocation (Borio, Galati, and Heath
(2008) and Papaioannou, Portes, and Siourounis (2006)). Further, even if one ignores
the fact that official reserve managers are portfolio optimizers, Treasury purchases
made in pursuit of exchange rate targets are endogenous to yields. A simple example
illustrates this point. Suppose that the Federal Reserve unexpectedly raises the federal
funds rate, shifting the level of the yield curve upward and raising the value of the
dollar. To foreign central banks, this corresponds to a weakening of their domestic
currencies. Those central banks maintaining below-equilibrium nominal exchange rate
pegs, as China did at least during the mid-2000s, will now need to purchase fewer
Treasuries to maintain the weakness of their currencies. In this example, causation
runs from yields to official purchases, not the other way around. Thus, foreign official
Treasury purchases are endogenous to yields. Overcoming this endogeneity in both
3
private and official Treasury purchases requires an identification scheme.
Researchers have used two broad approaches to overcome the endogeneity of for-
eign purchases, but neither is fully satisfactory. The dominant approach is the event
study. By focusing on the behavior of Treasury yields in short periods of time, of a few
days or less, around either actual foreign Treasury purchases or announcements re-
garding future purchases, the event study methodology can attenuate the bias induced
by endogeneity. For example, Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the behavior
of yields within 2-hour windows around surprise announcements regarding Chinese
exchange rate policy. These are also surprises regarding future Chinese official Trea-
sury purchases, since purchases of dollar-denominated assets (mostly Treasuries) are
the mechanism by which the exchange rate is managed. The identifying assumption
is that the policy surprises cause the large moves in yields seen immediately after the
surprise. The tight chronological ordering argues in favor of causality running from
purchases to yields (rather than from yields to purchases) and the narrow observation
windows argue in favor of ruling out omitted variables. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack
(2004) and Abe (2007) are other studies using broadly similar event study methods in
evaluating foreign purchases. This methodology is also very widely used in the related
literature on the recent large scale asset purchases in response to the financial crisis
(Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011), and Wright (2012), among many others).
The event study methodology has two major drawbacks, however. First, there are
relatively few discrete events to study, leading to concerns regarding small samples.
Second, event studies cannot provide estimates of the dynamic impact of foreign
purchases; they must focus on narrow periods of time to achieve identification. As a
result, generalizing the findings of event studies to economically meaningful periods
of time requires additional assumptions.
The second broad approach to the identification problem has been to use instru-
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mental variables. Conditional on finding valid and strong instruments, this approach
is a promising solution to the identification problem. However, finding satisfactory
instruments is challenging. Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez, and Thomas (2012) report
some success in finding instruments for foreign official purchases, but not for private
purchases.1 This forces them to separate flows into official and private flows, which
is undesirable given the limited ability of the data to accurately distinguish between
the two (see Bertaut and Tryon (2007) for more on this topic). Further, lacking
valid instruments, they must assume that private purchases are exogenous. This is a
questionable identifying assumption.
I employ a sign-identified VAR to assess the impacts of foreign Treasury purchases
on yields because this methodology offers several improvements over the alternatives.
First and foremost, it allows me to achieve identification, albeit set identification, with
a relatively well-understood identification scheme and without imposing economically
indefensible identifying restrictions. Further, it makes the restrictions that I do apply
much more transparent, allowing for meaningful discussion of them. Second, unlike
an event study, this approach allows me to estimate of the dynamic impacts of foreign
Treasury purchases on yields. In the Results section, I report impulse responses of
the factors of the yield curve, of individual yields, and of term premia over a 5-
year horizon. These confidence intervals exclude zero over a wide range of horizons.
Third, as this last point suggests, I can straightforwardly characterize the impact of
purchases on yields over economically meaningful horizons. Fourth, by employing a
VAR in the factors of the yield curve, I can parsimoniously summarize the impact
on the entire yield curve. Finally, by estimating the dynamic response of the entire
yield curve, I am able to decompose the behavior of yields into the responses of
term premia and expected future short rates. There is very little empirical evidence
on the behavior of the individual components of yields following purchases, either
1See also Sierra (2010).
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purchases by foreigners or by domestic central banks. My results suggest that this
decomposition of yields is informative and has important implications for the impacts
of purchases.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the empirical model and
the technique of sign-identification in detail, while comparing this empirical method-
ology to relevant alternatives. Section 1.3 motivates the identifying restrictions that
I use. Section 1.4 presents the empirical results and discusses the trade-offs between
the strength of the results and the strength of the identifying restrictions. Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, I will describe the model and the data I use, argue that this model is
well-suited to assessing the impact of purchases on yields, and discuss the technique
of sign identification.
1.2.1 VAR Specification
To identify the effects of foreign Treasury purchases on Treasury yields, I employ a
monthly, 4-variable VAR of lag order 12:






















ut ∼ N (0,Σ), and a is a column vector of constants.
The variable flows is the accumulation of the monthly net purchases of Treasury
securities by all foreign agents over the preceding 12 months. I use accumulated
capital flows as a straightforward way to smooth the highly volatile monthly data
and also to make my results more comparable to other studies, which also smooth
the data in this way. Because the flows variable exhibits twelfth-order autocorrelation
by construction, I choose the lag order of the VAR to be 12.
My choice of the monthly data used to construct the accumulated flows variable is
motivated by the quality of available monthly data. Broadly, the raw monthly flows
data, from the Treasury International Capital (TIC) surveys have three problems.
First, the Treasury conducts monthly flows surveys and annual holdings (stocks) sur-
veys, and these two surveys produce inconsistent results. To address this shortcoming
of the data, I use TIC data adjusted as in Bertaut and Tryon (2007). As is conven-
tionally done in the literature, Bertaut and Tryon assume that the comprehensive
annual surveys of holdings are accurate. This assumption is plausible, given the more
detailed nature of the annual holdings surveys. They then adjust the raw monthly
flows data to make them consistent with the annual surveys by, for example, account-
ing for otherwise ignored valuation changes. This adjustment gives a series for net
Treasury purchases that is consistent across survey measures.
The other two shortcomings of the data are harder to overcome. The second
shortcoming of the data is poor attribution of net purchases to the type of purchaser
(official versus private) and the third is poor attribution to the nationality of the
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purchaser. Bertaut and Tryon (2007) offer an ad hoc solution to these two problems,
but admit that they are harder to address than the first issue. Because of these data
limitations, I do not disaggregate the data by type or nationality of purchaser. I focus
on total net foreign purchases, adjusted as in Bertaut and Tryon (2007).
The variables level, slope, and curvature are the first three factors of the yield
curve. They are named according to the convention dating to Litterman and Scheinkman
(1991). I follow results in Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Diebold and Li (2006), and
Diebold, Rudebusch, and Arouba (2006) and define the yield curve factors as linear
combinations of yields. Specifically, denoting the j-year yield at time t by ij,t, I define
the factors as follows:
levelt =
i1,t + i5,t + i10,t
3
slopet = i10,t − i1,t
curvaturet = 2i5,t − (i1,t + i10,t)
Such linear combinations of yields have been shown by other studies, including those
mentioned above, to behave very much like the latent factors derived from formal
term structure models. While the precise maturities of the yields chosen tend to vary
from study to study, my results are robust to alternative choices. For the individual
yields, I use the monthly average of nominal, daily, and continuously compounded
zero-coupon Treasury yields from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006).
I use data from January 1985 through June 2011, based on the availability of
revised cross-border Treasury flows data, which is available only with a substantial
lag. Finally, note that the ordering of the variables in yt is irrelevant, as I am not
using ordering restrictions for identification.
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1.2.2 Rationale For This Specification
As discussed in the introduction to the paper, there are several reasons for using
a VAR to assess the impacts of foreign Treasury purchases on Treasury yields. In
short, a VAR allows for the use of sensible, relatively well-understood identification
techniques to parsimoniously estimate the dynamic impacts of purchases on the entire
yield curve.
A macro-finance term structure model (MTSM), of the sort in Ang and Piazzesi
(2003), is an alternative approach, but I do not use such a model for two reasons.
First, one might suppose that an MTSM would give more rigorous results because
it brings the power of asset pricing theory to the data. Specifically, the no-arbitrage
condition assumed in such models provides restrictions on the elements of the VAR
slope matrices (the A’s above). However, Joslin, Le, and Singleton (2013) show the-
oretically and in the context of illustrative examples that these restrictions provide
little benefit. The results from a much simpler VAR in the factors the yield curve,
as I implement here, are very nearly identical to the results from much more sophis-
ticated term structure models. Second, the more complicated structure of MTSMs
would require that the econometric identification techniques be more complex and
less well-understood. In MTSMs, the evolution of the factors of the yield and of
the individual yields are modeled with separate equations. This fact would make
the imposition of, say, sign restrictions challenging. One cannot sensibly restrict the
behavior of individual yields without restricting the evolution of the factors of the
yield curve. How one might impose consistent restrictions across the equations is not
well-understood. In any event, MTSMs offer little benefit, regardless of whether the
identification problem is solved.
A potential issue with my model is the topic of unspanned factors of the yield
curve. As discussed in Duffee (2011) and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010),
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the assumptions underlying standard asset pricing theory imply that all information
relevant to the current state and future behavior of the yield curve is captured in bond
yields today. If this is not true, bonds are mispriced. If it is true, then any variable
known at time t that is not derived from the yield curve, including foreign purchases
of Treasuries, should have no predictive power for yields from time t forward. Only in
a knife-edge parameterization of asset pricing models might such a variable, referred
to as an unspanned factor of the yield curve, have any true predictive power for future
yields.
However, while a model which includes only the factors of the yield curve might
be expected to fit the data better, such a model is not especially interesting from
a macroeconomic perspective. I am interested in examining the impact of Treasury
flows on yields, not the impact of yields on yields. My specification allows me to
estimate the structural impulse responses of a shock to flows on the yield curve. The
fact that the model might also be interpreted as a model of four factors of the yield
curve, one of them unspanned, is potentially interesting. However, it is not relevant
to the question at hand.
1.2.3 The VAR Identification Problem
To provide context for later discussion of the identifying restrictions and to provide
background on the identification technique, I will now briefly explain the identification
problem with VARs and how sign identification addresses it.
First, consider a general structural VAR model of a form comparable to the re-




Bjyt−j + εt, , (1.2)
where yt is an 4 × 1 vector as discussed above, b is an 4 × 1 vector of constants, Bj
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is 4 × 4, and εt ∼ N (0, I). That fact that B0 is allowed to be anything besides a
diagonal matrix leaves open the possibility of contemporaneous interaction among
the variables. That is, it allows for endogeneity.












Ajyt−j + ut, (1.4)
where the second line is clearly the reduced form model. Ordinarily, the economist
does not know the structural model. That is, he does not know the values of Bj,
j = 0, 1, . . . , 12. In particular, because he does not know B0, he does not know the
nature of the endogeneity and so cannot directly overcome it. While he does not
know B0, he does know that Var (εt) = I by assumption, and so he knows that






= Var (B−10 εt).
Now, Σ is estimable. However, being a variance-covariance matrix, Σ is symmetric
and so has only 10 unique elements (in the case that it is 4× 4). On the other hand,
B−10 has 16 unique elements. Thus, there are more unknowns than equations and so
there are an infinite number of admissible solutions for B−10 . In particular, if B̄
−1
0 is
a candidate solution, then so is B̄−10 P for any orthogonal matrix P . To see this, note
that
Var (B̄−10 Pεt) = B̄
−1
0 PP
′ (B̄−10 )′ = B̄−10 (B̄−10 )′ = Var (B̄−10 εt),
where the second equality follows from the orthogonality of P . Thus, without further
restrictions, the economist cannot identify a unique B−10 which is associated with a
unique structural model. Without knowing B−10 , the economist cannot assess the
impact of the structural shocks εt on yt. Specifically, the reduced form errors, ut, will
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be some unknown and economically uninteresting linear combination of the shocks to
flows, level, slope, and curvature.
Traditionally, the identification problem is solved by imposing sufficient equality
restrictions on the elements of B−10 to identify a unique matrix and structural model.
These restrictions are generally motivated by economic theory, separate empirical
evidence, or knowledge of institutional details. Arguably the most common set of
restrictions are exclusion restrictions, typically restricting that the above-diagonal
elements of B−10 are zero. In such an identification scheme, the ordering of variables
in yt is important (unlike in this paper). These exclusion restrictions reduce the
number of unknowns by precisely enough to identify a unique B−10 . Such a method
is commonly used to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on output and
prices.
Theory and evidence do not support such restrictions in this instance. To make
the point clear, I will consider why no element of B−10 can be subjected to equality
restrictions. First, foreign Treasury purchases are certainly endogenous to the con-
temporaneous yield curve, especially when time is measured in months. To illustrate
this point, suppose that the level of the yield curve rises, perhaps because the Federal
Reserve raises the federal funds rate. First, portfolio optimizers should be expected to
react quickly to changes in asset prices; they should certainly react within the month.
Second, changes in the yield curve affect exchange rates almost immediately (see,
for example, Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2007)). Surely, then, foreign central
banks pegging to the dollar will change their net purchases of Treasuries within the
month. Thus, no element in the first row of B−10 can be restricted to zero. Since
economists do not have precise estimates of the impact of the yield curve on flows at
the monthly frequency, no element of the first row of B−10 can be restricted to any
other fixed value, either.
Next, the factors of the yield curve are endogenous to contemporaneous Treasury
12
purchases. For example, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), Abe (2007), and the
second chapter of this dissertation all show that yields respond within no more than
a day to Treasury purchases. Chapter 2 shows that yields respond within two hours.
Shocks to Treasury flows contemporaneously influence the factors of the yield curve.
Further, the impacts are only imprecisely estimated. Thus, the elements of the first
column of B−10 cannot be restricted to particular values, either.
Finally, the factors of the yield curve are endogenous to one another contempora-
neously. Given my definitions of the factors, this is almost necessary by pure algebra.
More generally, theory and evidence offer no particular value for the contemporaneous
effect of, say, the slope of the yield curve on its level. So, the remaining off-diagonal
elements of B−10 cannot be restricted. The diagonal elements can be normalized as
the econometrician desires.
Thus, I cannot uniquely identify B−10 . Strictly speaking, there are of course other
techniques to identify a unique B−10 , such as long-run restrictions (as in Blanchard
and Quah (1989)). These alternatives also appear ill-suited to my question because
the needed identifying restrictions are difficult to defend.
Although equality restrictions cannot be economically motivated, I can achieve
set identification of B−10 using inequality (sign) restrictions on the impulse response
functions.
1.2.4 Sign Identification
In spite of the fact that economic theory and evidence are insufficient to identify a
unique structural model, they do provide some guidance as to what a “reasonable”
structural model might look like. Sign identification allows me to address the iden-
tification problem by limiting the class of structural models to a manageable set of
“reasonable” models. This is done by discarding all structural models whose impulse
response functions exhibit certain undesirable properties. These restrictions on the
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impulse responses are implemented as restrictions either on the signs of the elements
of the structural impulse responses or on the signs of linear combinations of those
elements. There are many inequality restrictions which are economically justifiable,
in spite of the fact that there are no justifiable equality restrictions.
For concreteness, consider an example. Asset pricing theory and event study
evidence suggest that an increase in net foreign Treasury purchases should not raise
yields. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that foreign purchases depress yields, at
least temporarily. Thus we might say that any reasonable structural model would
be such that a structural shock to Treasury purchases does not raise the level of the
yield curve. Based on the same evidence, we might also say that such a shock does
not steepen the yield curve. The particular sign restrictions used will be discussed in
more detail below, but these should serve as a motivational examples.
These sign restrictions are direct restrictions on the impulse response functions
implied by the structural models and are indirect restrictions on the elements of B−10 .
In the case of restrictions on the sign of impulse responses within the period of the
structural shock, they are linear inequality restrictions. The numerous other sign
restrictions which can placed on the impulse responses are often complex non-linear
restrictions on B−10 .
Once one chooses a list of sign restrictions to impose on the impulse responses,
one only needs to summarize the set of models that satisfy the sign restrictions. I
adopt a Bayesian approach to summarizing the models. I assume a uniform prior over
the set of rotation matrices and a diffuse prior on the reduced form VAR coefficients.
More specifically, I impose sign restrictions computationally in several steps, fol-
lowing the general methods of Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005), as modified in Inoue
and Kilian (2013):
1. To address estimation uncertainty regarding the reduced form parameters Aj,
j = 1, ..., 12, c, and Σ, I draw a large number of them from the posterior
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distribution. The posterior distribution is derived analytically from a standard
non-informative (Jeffreys) prior. This prior admits a posterior distribution for
the reduced form parameters given by
Σ ∼ IW(Σ̂, T − np− 1)
α ∼ N (α̂,Σ⊗Q−1),
where IW denotes the inverse-Wishart distribution. The vector α is the vec-
torization of A = [a A1 A2 ... A12]
′, T is the number of observations, n is the
number of variables in yt (4, in this case), and p is the lag order of the VAR
(12, in this case). Hats over variables denote the estimated value. The matrix
Q is defined to be
Q =














2. The next step is to address uncertainty regarding the identification of the
structural model (that is, uncertainty over B−10 ). To do so, for each draw
of the reduced form parameters, I draw a large number of rotation matrices
B−10 , following the methodology of Rubio-Ramı́rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010).
The rotation matrices are constructed as the product of the lower triangular
Cholesky factor of Σ and a uniformly random orthogonal matrix P . That is,
B−10 = Chol (Σ)P.
Each pairing of a reduced form model with a randomly drawn rotation matrix
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corresponds to a different structural model. In the absence of any identifying
restrictions, each of the large number of resulting structural models are indis-
tinguishable from the perspective of the data and the model.
3. I then discard all models whose impulse response functions violate the sign
restrictions and keep those that satisfy the sign restrictions (the “admissible”
models).
4. For each structural model that satisfies the sign restrictions, I construct the
probability that that model is the true model following Inoue and Kilian (2013).
First, call the structural model parameters θ and let the function f(·) denote
a probability density. Let vec (·) denote the vectorization operator, vech (·) de-
note the half-vectorization operator (which vectorizes the diagonal and below-
diagonal elements of a matrix), and veck (·) denote the operator which vectorizes
the above-diagonal elements of a matrix. Finally, let Chol (Σ) denote the lower
triangular Cholesky factorization of the matrix Σ. Then, the value of the pos-
terior density over structural models evaluated at the model θ can be written
as
f(θ) ∝
(∣∣∣∣ ∂vec (θ)∂[α′ vech (Chol (Σ))′ veck (P )′]
∣∣∣∣)−1 ∣∣∣∣ ∂vech (Σ)∂vech (Chol (Σ))
∣∣∣∣ f(α|Σ)f(Σ).
5. Finally, I present the results of the exercise by plotting the impulse responses
of the modal (most likely) model with a joint confidence set constructed as
the outer envelope of the set of most likely models whose posterior probabilities
sum to 90% of the total probability mass. The resulting confidence sets reported
in the Section 1.4 are joint confidence sets. Unlike the more commonly used
point-wise confidence sets, my confidence sets take account of the dependence
of impulse responses across horizons. These confidence sets more effectively
control their true coverage.
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By characterizing the posterior probability of each structural model, I address two
significant shortcomings of standard, point-wise summaries of results. First, in sign-
identified models, point-wise measures of central tendency are misleading. Consider
the most commonly used point-wise measure of central tendency, the median. The
“median response function” is constructed by taking the median of the distribution
of all admissible models at each horizon, and stacking the medians into a single
vector. This measure of central tendency is very unlikely to correspond to any one
structural model. Thus, economists should never expect to actually see such an
impulse response. Moreover, even if the point-wise median does correspond to a
single structural model, there is no compelling reason to focus on that model. It is
simply one of many admissible models.
The second shortcoming I address using posterior probabilities regards the cover-
age of the confidence intervals. Researchers have long acknowledged that point-wise
confidence sets are misleading and may understate the true uncertainty regarding
impulse response functions. This is because point-wise sets do not take into account
the dependence of impulse responses across horizons. The joint confidence sets shown
below do take account of this dependence and so they better control the coverage the
confidence interval.
Using sign restrictions allows me to identify informative confidence intervals for
the impacts of foreign Treasury purchases on the yield curve without the need to
impose economically indefensible restrictions. This does come at some cost: I cannot
identify a unique model. As Section 1.4 will show, however, economically reasonable
sign restrictions are adequate to characterize the effects of purchases fairly precisely.
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1.3 Potential Identifying Restrictions
Before presenting the results of the sign identification exercise, I will discuss the
normalization of structural shocks and then enumerate and justify the sign restrictions
I use.
I normalize both the sign and the scale of the contemporaneous impact of struc-
tural shocks on their own variable. I normalize the structural flows shock to have a
$100 billion impact on the 12-month accumulation of flows in the month of the shock.
In spite of the fact that the flows variable is a 12-month accumulation of flows, this
normalization means that a structural shock to flows is an increase of purchases within
the month by $100 billion. I normalize shocks to the yield curve factors to have a
25 basis point (bp) impact on their own variable in the month of the shock. Flows
and all factors are unrestricted in their response to their own shocks in all subsequent
months.
Having discussed the normalization of the structural shocks, I now turn to the
three classes of sign restrictions that I consider.
1.3.1 Effect of the Flows Shock on the Level of the Yield
Curve
First, I consider restricting that a positive structural shock to flows does not raise the
level of the yield curve in the period of the shock. In intuitive terms, I am asserting
that if foreign central bankers were to buy $100 billion of Treasury securities in a
single month for reasons unrelated to the yield curve, this would not cause Treasury
yields in general to rise in that month. Recall that the level of the yield curve in this
paper is the average of the 1-, 5-, and 10- year yields. So, this sign restriction is a
restriction on the average of the yields and potentially still allows certain individual
yields to rise.
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This sign restriction is justifiable on the basis of both economic theory and em-
pirical evidence. Standard asset pricing theory suggests that an increase in foreign
demand for Treasuries should reduce yields on Treasuries, if only slightly. With more
investors demanding Treasury securities, the prices of Treasury securities must rise to
equate the available supply of Treasuries with the increased demand. As prices rise,
yields fall. This is referred to as the portfolio balance effect. The portfolio balance
effect should, in theory, be small because of the large supply of closely substitutable
assets (see Reinhart and Sack (2000)).
More recent theoretical models which capture the “preferred habitat” nature of
asset demand would suggest larger impacts of purchases on yields (Vayanos and Vila
(2009)).2 Such theoretical models assume that there are classes of investors who have
a strong preference for particular assets, perhaps due to legal or institutional con-
straints. For example, many financial institutions are legally required to hold assets
which are perceived to have low default risk or whose duration is similar to the insti-
tutions’ liabilities. This assumption of preferred habitat demand means that assets
are, in fact, less substitutable than they appear. If the assets are less substitutable,
then the same logic as in standard asset pricing theory would suggest the impacts of
purchases should be larger.
Empirical studies also provide substantial evidence that increases in demand for
Treasury securities lower Treasury yields. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), Abe
(2007), and Chapter 2 of this dissertation are all event studies which identify signifi-
cant negative impacts of foreign Treasury purchases on yields. Chapter 2 documents
the negative impacts across a range of maturities. Additionally, as the particular pur-
chaser is of only limited importance to the question, the substantial literature on the
efficacy of quantitative easing also provides evidence in support of this sign restriction
(among others, Gagnon et al. (2010), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011),
2These recent models are based on earlier work, such as in Modigliani and Sutch (1966), and
long-held informal beliefs among market participants.
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and Wright (2012)).3
In the baseline case (Section 1.4.1), I impose this sign restriction only for the first
month, but I do consider strengthening the restriction. In particular, one way in which
I consider strengthening the restriction is by extending the restriction beyond the
month of the shock (Section 1.4.4). I also consider imposing the stronger but closely
related restriction that all three yields individually do not rise with a flows shock
(Section 1.4.3). The weakest form of this assumption, imposed in the baseline case,
is sufficient to obtain informative results and further strengthening of the restriction
has little effect on the results.
1.3.2 Effect of the Flows Shock on the Slope of the Yield
Curve
The second class of sign restrictions that I consider are restrictions on the slope of the
yield curve. In particular, in the baseline case I impose that the yield curve does not
steepen (the slope does not rise) in response to a positive flows shock, in the month
of the shock. Given the definition of the slope factor in this paper, this restriction
amounts to requiring that the 10-year yield’s impulse response is lower than the 1-year
yield’s in the month of the shock. This restriction by itself does not require either
yield’s response to be non-positive.
This sign restriction can also be justified on the grounds of economic theory and
empirical evidence. To the extent that foreigners tend to buy in the middle and longer
sectors of the yield curve, the portfolio balance and preferred habitat effects should be
strongest there. Indeed, the substantial foreign accumulation of Treasury securities
3Of course, foreign Treasury purchases and quantitative easing by domestic central banks might
influence yields differently. While both should exert direct effects on bond prices by changing
outstanding asset supplies, quantitative easing might also influence investor expectations about
future policy or about the preferences of policymakers. Swanson (2011) and the discussion that
follows the paper offer detail on the channels through which quantitative easing might influence
yields. Foreign purchases seem unlikely to exert influence through any such additional channels.
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over the past few decades has primarily reflected foreign purchases of Treasury notes
and bonds, assets with maturities of greater than one year. Unfortunately, available
data does not offer a detailed breakdown of foreign Treasury holdings or purchases
by maturity. However, the aforementioned stylized fact supports the sign restriction.
Further, the short end of the yield curve, proxied by the 1-year yield in this paper,
largely reflects the level of the federal funds rate which is set by the Federal Reserve
and adjusted every several weeks. Thus, at least in the short run, the short rate is
likely less responsive to purchases than longer, less restricted yields.
Empirical evidence, in the form of event studies regarding recent unconventional
monetary policy, also supports this restriction on the slope of the yield curve. For
instance, Ehlers (2012) studies the Federal Reserve’s Maturity Extension Program
(MEP). In the MEP, the Fed sold $667 billion of short-maturity Treasuries and used
the proceeds to purchase long-maturity Treasuries. Thus, the increase in asset supply
at the short end of the yield curve was equal to the fall in asset supply at the long
end. Ehlers documents that the impacts of MEP-related announcements on the 5-
and 10-year yield were 10 to 20 times larger than the impact on the 1-year yield.
Additionally, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) show more broadly that
the impacts of the Fed’s large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) have been much larger
on long yields than on short yields.
In addition to the baseline restriction that the slope declines (Section 1.4.1), I
consider strengthening the restriction. I consider requiring that both the 5- and 10-
year yields are below the 1-year yield (Section 1.4.3) and imposing the restriction
over longer horizons (Section 1.4.4). The stronger forms of the restriction have little
effect on the results.
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1.3.3 Effect of the Flows Shock on Term Premia
A third type of restriction that I consider is on the term premia on 5- and 10-year
Treasury bonds. Specifically, a positive flows shock should not raise term premia in
the month of the shock.
Decomposing Yields
Before discussing this restriction further, I define the term premium in this model.







E t [i1,t+j] + TPm,t, (1.5)
where the first term corresponds to the expectations hypothesis and the second is
the m-year term premium. I assume that investors correctly anticipate the impulse
response of short rates, so that expected future short rates are proxied by actual
future short rates. That is, the impulse response of the first term is just an average
of the impulse responses, at the appropriate horizons, of the short rate. The impulse
response of the m-year term premium can then be constructed as the difference be-
tween the responses of the m-year yield and the corresponding average of expected
future short rates.
An additional contribution of this paper is in characterizing the behavior of these
two components of yields in response to foreign purchases. Most studies examine the
impact of purchases on yields as a whole or on term premia alone. None characterize
the impacts on both components, although both expected future short rates and term
premia should be expected to respond to purchases.
Economists seem to believe that Treasury purchases (or the outstanding supply of
Treasury securities) should only influence term premia. This belief is born out in the
22
models of Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Hamilton and Wu (2012). Casual discussion
among economists and papers such as Beltran et al. (2012) also focus on term premia.
However, purchases might also influence expected future short rates. The Federal
Reserve sets the short rate to achieve economic objectives, so if Treasury purchases
affect the economy, they should affect (expected) future short rates. As an example,
foreign Treasury purchases might broadly lower yields and cause a loosening of credit
conditions. The Federal Reserve would then respond either to the loosening of credit
or to the ensuing acceleration in the pace of real activity. It would presumably
respond by raising short rates and tightening policy. In this example, then, market
participants should raise their expectation of future short rates even as term premia
fall following foreign Treasury purchases. In this narrative, it is clear that the two
components move in opposite directions, meaning that the expected policy tightening
dampens the impact of purchases on yields. Indeed, I find evidence of this narrative
in Section 1.4. Ignoring the dynamics of both components individually is therefore
misleading.
Justifying Restrictions on Term Premia
Restricting the response of term premia following a shock to Treasury purchases is
motivated both by standard asset pricing theory and, more powerfully, by preferred
habitat models of the term structure. Both theories conclude that purchases should
lower yields on the assets being purchased by lowering their term premia (Vayanos
and Vila (2009) and Hamilton and Wu (2012)).
Restrictions on term premia are also supported by limited empirical evidence. In
particular, Beltran et al. (2012) decompose Treasury yields as described in Equation
(1.5) and study the impacts of foreign Treasury purchases on the term premium.
They find statistically and economically significant impacts of purchases on the term
premium. The impacts on term premia that they find are somewhat smaller than
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those found in this paper.
In the baseline case (Section 1.4.1), I impose that a positive structural shock
to flows does not raise 5- and 10-year term premia in the month of the shock. This
restriction has substantial impacts on the results and I consider relaxing the restriction
in Section 1.4.2. Extending the horizon over which the restriction applies has little
impact on the results, at least for economically justifiable horizons of less than a year
or two (Section 1.4.4).
1.4 Results
I now present the results of the sign identification exercises, grouped by the set of
identifying restrictions applied. In each case, I generate 400 million unique structural
models before the sign restrictions are applied by pairing each of 20,000 draws of the
orthogonal matrix P with each of 20,000 draws of the reduced form parameters from
their respective marginal posterior distributions.4 Of course, the majority of these
structural models are discarded. The distributions used to create the confidence
intervals are composed of those models that satisfy the sign restrictions, which never
number fewer than 350,000.
The confidence intervals shown are joint confidence sets. That is, the confidence
intervals take into account the dependence of models across horizons, unlike con-
ventional point-wise intervals. The confidence intervals are constructed as the outer
envelope of the set of most likely models which together represent 90% of the total
probability mass in the full empirical distribution of structural models. The modal
model is represented by a green line. Within each set of sign restrictions, the modal
impulse responses all correspond to the same structural model. See Section 1.2.4 for
more on the construction of the confidence sets and the selection of the modal model.
4The one exception is in Case 2, where, unfortunately, I must limit the number of models to
100 million. The sign restrictions are sufficiently conservative that many models are admissible and
must be saved, posing a problem of inadequate computational memory.
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1.4.1 Baseline Case
The baseline set of sign restrictions demonstrates that limited, easily justified restric-
tions are adequate to identify economically important impacts of foreign purchases.
The baseline results also suggest that the Federal Reserve responds to purchases, but
only slowly and partially.
In the baseline case, I apply three sign restrictions on the impulse responses to an
exogenous $100 billion foreign purchase of Treasury securities: the impulse responses
of the level and slope of the yield curve as well as term premia (on both 5- and 10-year
securities) are non-positive in the month of the flows shock.
In brief, it appears that a surprise $100 billion purchase of Treasuries substantially
lowers yields initially, but the effects are offset, with a lag of a few years, by a monetary
tightening. The decline in 5- and 10-year yields represents a large decline in term
premia coupled with a small rise in expected future short rates. These results suggest
that the flows shock causes a loosening of credit conditions, to which the Federal
Reserve responds with a monetary tightening. The monetary tightening occurs with
a lag and is insufficient to fully offset the impact on term premia for at least the first
two years or so after the shock.
Focusing on the factors of the yield curve, the flows shock shifts the level of the
yield curve down for a few years, and thereafter raises the level and flattens the slope
(Figure 1.1). The response of the level of the yield curve is significantly negative for
25 months following the flows shock. The maximum impact comes 15 months after
the surprise purchases, when the level of the yield curve is at least 58 basis points
lower than it would otherwise have been. At that point, the modal model shows a
decline of 77 basis points while a response of as much as 160 basis points cannot be
ruled out. After 3 to 4 years, the level of the yield curve rises significantly, with the
short rate rising the most, resulting in a statistically significant flattening of the yield
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curve beginning around 3 years after the shock. The confidence interval for the slope
of the yield curve 3 to 5 years after the shock ranges between about -35 and -150
basis points and the modal model bottoms at -49 basis points.
Term premia are significantly depressed for several years following the flows shock,
but expected future short rates are mostly higher (Figure 1.2). The term premium
on the 5-year note is significantly lower for 30 months after the shock and the modal
response is still negative after 4 years. The maximum impact on the 5-year term
premium comes 13 months after the shock, when the term premium is between 80
and 175 basis points lower. The modal response is lower by 85 basis points. The 10-
year term premium is significantly lower for just over 2 years and the modal response
is negative for almost 5 years. The maximum impacts on the 10-year term premium
occur 13-14 months after the shock, when the confidence interval spans -60 to -177
basis points and the modal response bottoms at -66 basis points.
Yields at all maturities are significantly lower for about 2 years after the shock,
with maximum impacts occurring in months 11 through 17 (Figure 1.3). The 1-year
yield is lowered by between 53 and 205 basis points, with the modal response lower
by 94 basis points. The modal impact on the 5-year yield is 88 basis points, within
a confidence interval of 61 to 158. The 10-year yield declines by between 49 and 130
basis points, with a modal decline of 68 basis points.
My results for the impacts on term premia are much larger than found elsewhere.
Evidence on the impact of purchases on term premia are limited, but Beltran et al.
(2012) estimate an impact on the 5-year term premium of about 50 basis points and
an impact on excess returns to holding 5-year notes of 39 to 62 basis points. These
impacts are smaller (in absolute value) than mine and lie outside of my confidence
interval at the point of maximum impact. A potential explanation for these different
results is that I better control for reverse causality.
My results for the impacts on yields as a whole are similar to or a bit larger than
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those found elsewhere. Warnock and Warnock (2009) estimate in a time series model
at the monthly frequency that a $100 billion purchase lowers the 10-year yield by
about 68 basis points. This estimate coincides with maximum impact on 10-year yield
in my modal model, though my confidence intervals are wide enough that much larger
impacts are possible. Event studies such as Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) and
D’Amico and King (2013) tend to find similar results. Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu
(2006) find little or no impact of purchases on yields. Chapter 2 of this dissertation
also appears to find impacts about as large as those found here, though some caution
is warranted in comparing those results given the different methods employed between
the two chapters.5
Finally, the results on the decomposition of yields suggest that purchases have
meaningful impacts on both term premia and expected future short rates. In spite of
this, economists’ discussion of the effects of purchases, either purchases by foreigners
or by domestic central banks, often focuses on the impacts on term premia. While I
find that term premia are significantly affected, expected future short rates are also
affected. Moreover, the impact of foreign purchases on expected future short rates
partially offsets the behavior of term premia, meaning yields are affected less than
term premia might suggest. So, although short rates may not be free to respond
within the month or the quarter, they should not be treated as exogenously fixed.
Because monetary policy responds to the state of the economy and credit markets,
short rates (and expectations regarding them) are also affected.
5Chapter 2 estimates the impact of surprises to expected future Treasury purchases by Chinese
officials in intra-daily windows around announcements regarding Chinese policy. The effects on yields
are estimated as a function of the innovations in currency forwards. Translating the quantitative
results from that approach into the context of cross-border Treasury flows at the monthly frequency
is not straightforward. Not only are the time horizons different (as is the case with all event studies),
but the measure of unanticipated purchases is also different.
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Figure 1.1: Baseline Case, Response of Flows and Yield Curve Factors. The response
of all variables in the VAR to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines
are the modal model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage
intervals. In the upper left panel (response of foreign Treasury purchases), vertical
axis is in billions of USD while the other three panels are in basis points. The
horizontal axes are in months following the shock.
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Figure 1.2: Baseline Case, Response of Yield Components. The response of the
average of expected future short rates and of term premia to a positive structural
flows shock. The bold green lines are the modal model and the confidence intervals in
blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals. The vertical axes are in basis points while
the horizontal axes are in months following the shock.
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Figure 1.3: Baseline Case, Response of Yields. The response of yields to a positive
structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the modal model and the confidence
intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals. The vertical axes are in basis
points while the horizontal axes are in months following the shock.
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1.4.2 Case 2: Relaxing the Restriction on Term Premia
Restricting the response of term premia has substantial impacts on the results. In
this case, I consider relaxing the restriction on 5- and 10-year term premia and obtain
implausible results. I maintain the restrictions on the response of the level and slope
of the yield curve in the month of the shock. The only difference relative to the
baseline case is that term premia are unrestricted here.
As Figure 1.4 shows, the impacts on term premia and expected future short rates
immediately following the shock all have the opposite sign relative to the baseline
case. The average of expected future short rates is initially significantly negative
here, reflecting the very large and persistent decline in the short rate (Figure 1.5). In
the modal model, the response of the expectations hypothesis portion of the 10-year
yield is lower by as much as 60 basis points, and the decline is statistically significant
for the first 2 and a half years following the shock. At the same time, term premia
initially rise. They are significantly higher for the first few months following the
shock.
The responses of all yields are larger and more persistent in the absence of the
term premium restriction (Figure 1.5). The maximum impacts are realized about 18
months after the shock and the responses differ from zero for about 3 years (1 year
longer than in the baseline case). The maximum impact on the 1-year yield is at least
150 basis points. For the 5- and 10-year yields, the maximum impacts are at least
100 and 80 basis points, respectively.
These impulse responses are implausible for a couple reasons, thus supporting
the restriction on term premia. First and most important is the fact that term
premia initially rise in response to a flows shock in the absence of the sign restriction.
That fact is hard to rationalize on the basis of economic theory or existing empirical
evidence. Second and less justifiably, the impacts under this identification appear
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larger than most economists seem to believe. Viewing the sign identification exercise
as an opportunity to directly impose the prior beliefs of the profession in order to
achieve identification, I would argue that these results show that the term premia
restriction should be imposed.
1.4.3 Case 3: Strengthening the Restrictions on Level and
Slope
Strengthening the contemporaneous restrictions on the level and slope of the yield
curve has very little effect on the results. In this case, I maintain the restriction
on term premia from the baseline case but strengthen the other two restrictions.
Strengthening the restriction on the level of the yield curve, I require that all yields
individually must not rise in response to a surprise foreign Treasury purchase (within
the month of the shock). This is stronger than the baseline restriction on the level
of the yield curve, which only restricts the average of yields. Strengthening the
restriction on the slope of the yield curve, I require that both the 5- and 10-year
yields decline by at least as much as the 1-year yield. This adds the restriction on
the 5-year yield relative to the baseline restriction on the slope of the yield curve. All
restrictions are imposed only for the month of the flows shock.
Focusing first on the decomposition of yields (Figure 1.6), it is clear that the
stronger restrictions only marginally affect the impulse responses. The modal model,
which is common to both Figures 1.6 and 1.7, is identical to the modal model in
the baseline case. The confidence intervals are somewhat narrower with the stronger
restrictions, however. That means that the expectations component of the 10-year
yield rises by a statistically significant amount following a positive flows shock. It
also means that the responses of both term premia are significantly different from
zero for an additional 6 to 8 months. Both term premia are lower for about 3 years
following the flows shock in this case. Finally, at maximum impact, the upper end
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Figure 1.4: Case 2, Response of Yield Components with Relaxed Restrictions on
Term Premia. The response of the average of expected future short rates and of term
premia to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the modal model
and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals. The vertical
axes are in basis points while the horizontal axes are in months following the shock.
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Figure 1.5: Case 2, Response of Yields with Relaxed Restrictions on Term Premia.
The response of yields to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines
are the modal model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage
intervals. The vertical axes are in basis points while the horizontal axes are in months
following the shock.
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of the confidence interval for the 10-year term premium is about 3 basis points lower
than in the baseline case, at -63 basis points.
The results for yields as a whole are also very similar to those in the baseline case.
The confidence intervals are lower by 5 to 10 basis points in the first couple of years
after the shock and are generally narrower than in the baseline case. The responses
are significantly negative for 2 to 3 months longer. The basic narrative for the impact
of a flows shock is unchanged.
1.4.4 Case 4: Extending the Horizon of the Restrictions
In the fourth and final case shown in this paper, it’s clear that extending the horizon
over which restrictions are applied has little impact on the results. In this case, I
restrict that level, slope, and term premia are non-positive for the first 6 months
following a flows shock. These are the same restrictions as in the baseline case, but
they are applied over a longer horizon. As in case 3, the modal model is the same as
the baseline modal model.
The response of the expectations component of the 5-year yield is somewhat more
significant and is significant for longer; other confidence intervals are not meaningfully
impacted (Figures 1.8 and 1.9). Other than in the upper left panel, the confidence
intervals in Figure 1.8 are only about 1 to 3 basis points narrower at any horizon
relative to the baseline case. A similarly small difference is evident in the confidence
intervals in Figure 1.9.
Obviously, by further extending the horizon over which the sign restrictions hold,
I could further affect the impulse responses. However, the restrictions become harder
to justify as the horizon grows. It is also worth noting that extending the horizon of
the stronger sign restrictions from case 3 has a similarly small impact on the results.
35
























































Figure 1.6: Case 3, Response of Yield Components with Stronger Restrictions on
Level and Slope. The response of the average of expected future short rates and of
term premia to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the modal
model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals. The
vertical axes are in basis points while the horizontal axes are in months following the
shock.
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Figure 1.7: Case 3, Response of Yields with Stronger Restrictions on Level and Slope.
The response of yields to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the
modal model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals.
The vertical axes are in basis points while the horizontal axes are in months following
the shock.
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Figure 1.8: Case 4, Response of Yield Components with Extended Horizon of Re-
strictions. The response of the average of expected future short rates and of term
premia to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the modal model
and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals. The vertical
axes are in basis points while the horizontal axes are in months following the shock.
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Figure 1.9: Case 4, Response of Yields with Extended Horizon of Restrictions. The
response of yields to a positive structural flows shock. The bold green lines are the
modal model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals.




This paper identifies the effects of foreign Treasury purchases on Treasury yields in the
context of a sensible, well-understood identification scheme. While previous papers
have investigated the impacts of purchases on yields, their identification schemes are
often questionable. Event studies might achieve identification, but by their nature
they can only identify the impacts within very narrow windows. These windows
are too short to be economically meaningful, and extrapolating their results requires
additional assumptions. The instrumental variables approach is promising, but valid
and strong instruments for both official and private Treasury flows have yet to be
found. So, although the literature has made great progress, the topic is not yet
settled.
I take the literature one step further and use a technique not yet applied to
this literature, identifying effects that are similar to, or perhaps a bit larger, than
those found elsewhere. In my baseline results, I find that an exogenous purchase of
$100 billion of Treasury securities by foreigners in a single month significantly lowers
Treasury yields across the term structure for around 2 years following the purchases.
The 1- and 5-year yields decline by perhaps 90 to 100 basis points while the ten-year
yield declines by about 70 basis points (all within much wider confidence intervals),
with the largest impacts coming a year or more after the purchase.
This behavior of Treasury yields reflects the interesting but not previously explored
behavior of term premia and expected future short rates in response to purchases.
I find that purchases have very large effects of term premia, but that these effects
are partially offset by monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve. This monetary
tightening slightly raises the expected future path of short rates, thereby dampening
the effects of purchases on overall yields.
The results in this paper, beyond directly addressing the impact of foreign Trea-
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sury purchases on yields, can shed light on two topics related to recent monetary
policy. First and most obviously, these results suggest that the large scale asset pur-
chases recently undertaken by central banks around the world should be effective in
lowering long-term interest rates. Domestic central bank purchases of assets might
influence the stance of monetary policy in several ways, but it seems clear that if
foreign purchases of domestic assets affect domestic interest rates, then so should
purchases by the domestic central bank. Second, to the extent that the US housing
bubble and subsequent financial crisis were fueled by easy credit, my findings suggest
foreign purchases of US assets may have played an important role.
41
CHAPTER 2
Identifying the Effects of Chinese Treasury Pur-
chases Using High-Frequency Data
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, many economists have concluded that large asset purchases can sub-
stantially impact asset prices and yields. This conclusion is supported primarily by
empirical research on two episodes in which official purchases of US Treasury secu-
rities were quite large: the period in the mid-2000s when Asian central banks were
buying Treasuries at an unprecedented rate and the various rounds of large scale
asset purchases (LSAPs) undertaken by the Federal Reserve in response to weak US
demand following the financial crisis. In the first episode, while foreign officials were
buying large quantities of Treasuries, long-term interest rates in the US were unusu-
ally low given the state of the macroeconomy (Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006)
and Backus and Wright (2007)). These stylized facts motivated research which sug-
gests that foreign official purchases may have caused the low rates. In the second
episode, the Federal Reserve undertook LSAPs with the explicit intention of lowering
bond yields and raising asset prices in order to stimulate economic activity. Empirical
studies suggest that the LSAPs have been modestly successful in lowering yields.
Understanding the link between official bond purchases and yields is of great sig-
nificance to policy economists. Some analysts suggest that the period of low long-term
interest rates in the mid-2000s helped to inflate asset price bubbles, laying the foun-
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dations of the financial crisis. It is telling that the most significant asset price bubble
was tied to housing, which is very sensitive to long rates. Clearly, understanding why
interest rates were so low is important, as it is central to understanding the roots of
the financial crisis. Further, the financial crisis and resulting recession caused short
term interest rates to fall to zero in an environment of weak aggregate demand. With
short rates at zero, the Federal Reserve has had to find alternative approaches to
stimulate aggregate demand, and one of its main innovations has been the advent
of LSAPs. So, the effect of large asset purchases, especially official purchases of US
Treasury securities, might be part of both the cause and treatment for the financial
crisis.
In spite of the importance of and also existing research on the link between official
purchases and yields, further empirical research is needed to address two notable issues
that remain. First, estimates of the impacts of purchases within and between the two
episodes differ greatly. Research on the effects of LSAPs find impacts on yields which
are more modest than the estimated impacts of foreign official purchases. Second,
and more importantly for this paper, there is a fundamental identification problem
which, if left untreated, leads to endogeneity bias.
I address these two concerns by applying a new identification technique to over-
come endogeneity and produce reliable estimates of the impacts of foreign official
purchases of Treasuries on Treasury yields. Specifically, I construct a new measure
of surprise Chinese official Treasury purchases, use high frequency data, and apply
the technique of identification by heteroskedasticity. These allow me to obtain unbi-
ased estimates of the effects of Chinese official purchases of Treasuries on Treasury
yields and contribute to the existing empirical work on the link between purchases
and yields. I find the effects of Chinese purchases to be larger than previous work
has indicated, where the difference is plausibly attributed to endogeneity bias. As a
benchmark, I find that Chinese Treasury purchases undertaken to maintain the cur-
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rency peg may have lowered yields across the yield curve by around 100 basis points
in the mid-2000s, with some smaller and substantially larger impacts possible.
As discussed previously, the greatest difficulty in estimating the impacts of foreign
official purchases on yields is that such purchases are endogenous. Not only might
purchases affect yields, but yields might effect purchases. Indeed, this chapter and
the previous suggest that causality runs in both directions. First, in the simplest
intuitive terms, purchases can affect yields because purchases represent an increase
in demand for the securities, causing their prices to rise and yields to fall. Second,
yields can affect foreign official purchases because many foreign central banks main-
tain exchange rate targets. Because yields drive movements in exchange rates which
must be offset by foreign exchange interventions, which most often take the form of
Treasury purchases, yields indirectly drive purchases. Thus, causality runs in both
directions between purchases and yields. This simultaneity leads to the fundamental
identification problem.
Failing to take address this simultaneity leads to biased estimates of the impact of
purchases on yields, and I present evidence that this bias is toward zero. Specifically,
I find that a positive shock to Treasury yields causes a decline in foreign official
purchases. This would cause studies failing to fully control for endogeneity to find
smaller impacts of purchases on yields, potentially explaining why the estimates in
this paper (and Chapter 1) are generally larger than those in the existing literature.
Moreover, it is not surprising that an increase in yields would cause a decline in foreign
official purchases. For example, suppose that better-than-expected news about the
US economy arrives or that the Federal Reserve increases the fed funds target by
more than expected. Conventional theory says that these events should tend to raise
US interest rates and cause the dollar to strengthen. The stronger dollar, in turn,
decreases the pressure on foreign central banks to buy dollars to keep their currencies
undervalued.
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The literature on the effects of foreign purchases of Treasuries has gradually be-
gun addressing the endogeneity problem. Most of the early research in this literature
assumed the impacts of yield changes on purchases was sufficiently small that the si-
multaneity could be ignored and one could simply regress yields on purchases (Rude-
busch, Swanson, and Wu (2006) and Warnock and Warnock (2009)). Subsequent
research has applied three standard identification schemes to address the endogene-
ity. Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez, and Thomas (2013) apply instrumental variables
to overcome endogeneity in a low-frequency VAR setting, though strong and valid
instruments are difficult to find.1 Chapter 1 of this dissertation applies the technique
of sign identification in a low-frequency VAR, though such an identification scheme
cannot identify a unique set of model parameters. Lastly, relatively early research
by Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) used an event study method at the daily
frequency. While event study techniques can in principle overcome endogeneity, this
paper finds that event study estimates are potentially still subject to endogeneity.
To contribute a new estimate of the impacts of purchases on yields, I combine in-
tradaily data and the technique of identification by heteroskedasticity (IDH) (Rigobon
(2003)). By focusing on very narrow time windows, I can reduce the endogeneity bias
in the same way that an event study (ES) would, although I find that a simple ES
model still suffers from significant endogeneity bias in this case. Adding IDH, dis-
cussed below, addresses this remaining endogeneity by exploiting known changes in
the variance of structural policy shocks across the sample of data.
To implement IDH, I will need three items: a high-frequency measure of changes
in Treasury yields, a high-frequency measure of surprise foreign official purchases of
Treasuries, and a subsample of the data in which the shock to surprise purchases is
highly variable. I must have these three items over the entire sample period, which
runs from 2005 through 2014. Measuring changes in Treasury yields is straightfor-
1Sierra (2010) also employs IV using a similar set of instruments.
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ward: I use the rates implied by soonest-to-expire (“front”) 5- and 10-year Treasury
note futures and 30-year Treasury bond futures. Futures contract prices are available
intraday and overnight, making them a natural choice for my purposes. The measure
of surprise foreign official purchases, however, is more complicated.
Another contribution of this paper, then, is in creating a new measure of surprise
foreign official purchases based on currency forward contracts. The difficulty arises
because, while I would like to have a measure of the dollar value of the surprise
component of foreign official Treasury purchases, no such measure is available. The
ideal surprise variable would be constructed as the difference between expected and
announced Treasury purchases by Chinese officials. However, there is no data which
could be used to directly measure market expectations of Chinese official Treasury
purchases. Further, Chinese officials do not announce their schedule of Treasury
purchases, either before or after the purchases are made. I also need a high-frequency
measure of this hard-to-measure surprise. To construct a proxy measure of surprise
purchases, I focus on China and use changes in prices on US dollar (USD)/Renminbi
(RMB) currency forward contracts. The change in forward contract prices can be
thought of as a measure of the exchange rate surprise. Surprises in the level of
pegged exchange rates translate directly into surprises in expected official purchases
of Treasuries, since such purchases are made to maintain the peg at the chosen level.
Finally, I must identify two subsamples in the data, one in which the variance
of the shock to exchange rate expectations is higher and one in which it is lower.
IDH exploits this heteroskedasticity to identify the model and overcome endogeneity.
To identify a subsample in which shocks to exchange rate expectations (and thus
Chinese official purchases) are highly variable, I identify a set of 30 days (the “event
set”) on which Chinese officials made apparently surprising statements regarding their
foreign exchange policy. On these announcement days, we should expect the shock
to exchange rate expectations to be larger than on other, non-announcement days.
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Section 2.2 discusses the structure of the model and explains IDH. With the
context of the model and IDH in hand, Section 2.3 discusses the event set, in which
Chinese officials made surprising announcements, and how the set was chosen. Then,
Section 2.4 describes the data and the financial assets that underly it; Section 2.5
presents the results and compares them both with the existing literature and with
simple ES estimates; and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model Structure and Identification
The purpose of this section is to describe the model and identification technique
(IDH) that I will use to obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of Chinese official
purchases. This section will provide the necessary context for the discussion of the
event set and data construction which follow.
Consider the model given by
∆et = β∆yt + εt (2.1)
∆yt = α∆et + ηt. (2.2)
Here, ∆yt is the change in Treasury yields (for 5-, 10-, or 30-year Treasuries) and ∆et
is the surprise to exchange rate expectations at a particular horizon (1 week, 3 months,
or 12 months). More detail on the precise construction of these variables will be given
in Section 2.4. Recall that exchange rate surprises are a proxy measure of surprise
purchases of Treasury securities by Chinese official institutions. This model captures
the two directions of causality discussed above: purchases drive yields and yields
drive purchases. Note that this model explicitly ignores other variables which might
drive yields and exchange rates (or Treasury purchases). This exclusion is justifiable
because I will be measuring yield and exchange rate changes over very narrow intraday
windows which exclude other sources of variation (or at least systematic sources). The
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exclusion is also necessitated by the fact that other relevant variables are generally
not measured at such high frequency.
This model presents the standard simultaneity problem. As the model is stated,
the two equations cannot be estimated by OLS because the resulting estimates would
be biased. This arises because the simultaneous equations imply that the regressor
in each equation is correlated with the error term.
Now, consider the model in matrix form in order to view the identification problem




















Taking the variance of both sides of this equation, we obtain
 Ve Vye
Vye Vy
















 = ( 1
1− αβ








Given that the left hand side is observable, this yields a set of three equations (one each
for Vy, Vye, and Ve) in four unknowns: α, β, σ
2
ε , and σ
2
η. Clearly, there are not enough
equations. This is the identification problem caused by simultaneity/endogeneity
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from another perspective.
Considering the identification problem from these two perspectives simultaneously
provides the foundation for understanding the identification schemes in both the ES
methodology and in IDH. I will discuss the identification technique in an ES first, both
because IDH can be viewed as a relaxation of the identifying assumptions of event
studies and because the ES approach provides a useful introduction to the structure
of IDH. In any case, I will discuss the shortcomings of the ES estimators (relative to
the IDH estimators) in Section 2.5.3, so a review of the ES model is warranted. After
discussing the ES identification scheme, I will discuss IDH.
2.2.1 Identification in the Event Study Model
In the event study model, the parameter of interest is α, which is the effect of exchange
rate or Treasury purchase surprises on yields. As discussed above, simultaneity gives
rise to endogeneity bias, so the estimate of α obtained by simply applying OLS to
Equation (2.2) will in general be biased. In particular, the probability limit of the
OLS estimate of α will be given by




The ES identification scheme is to apply the model to changes in yields and ex-
change rates only over very short windows around events in which the structural
shock to exchange rates (or Treasury purchases) is believed to be large. The events
are selected based on narrative analysis or knowledge of institutional detail and the
windows over which changes are measured are chosen to be small enough that, pre-
sumably, the only thing driving changes in both variables of interest is the structural
exchange rate shock. By narrowing the sample of data to times of such events, the
identifying assumption is that the variance of ε, σ2ε , is much larger than the variance
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of the η, thus minimizing or eliminating the endogeneity bias. In the limit, as σ2η
goes to zero (or the ratio of the variances becomes infinitely large), the bias vanishes.
From the perspective of the model in matrix form (Equation (2.4)), the identifying
assumption is that σ2η = 0, reducing the number of unknowns to three and leaving
the system of equations exactly identified. In principle, the shorter the window of
time around the event, the more likely this assumption is to be true.2
In some cases, including some in this paper, this identifying assumption appears
to be too strong for practicably short windows around events. Rigobon and Sack
(2004) point out that for some event studies using windows as small as one day,
the assumption appears to be violated sufficiently to generate statistically significant
bias. I also find, in the context of the model above, that significant bias remains
even with windows as short as one hour around announcements. In particular, for
some measures of exchange rate surprises, my ES estimates appear to be biased and
inconsistent.
Because my coefficient of interest apparently may remain biased due to the vi-
olation of the identifying assumption, weaker identifying assumptions are needed.
Fortunately, IDH provides such a set of assumptions.
2.2.2 Identification by Heteroskedasticity
Identification by heteroskedasticity (Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003,
2004, 2005)) allows the ES identifying assumption on structural error variances to be
relaxed. Whereas the identifying assumption above was that σ2ε must be infinitely
large relative to σ2η around events, the assumption of IDH is simply that the relative
difference between the two on event days must be larger than it is on all other days.
Considering a larger sample of days composed of both event days and non-event days,
assuming the ratio of shock variances changes across the two subsamples, and assum-
2Of course, the window must remain wide enough to allow for market participants to learn of the
event, digest the information, and re-price the financial assets underlying the data.
50
ing that α and β are constant across both subsamples is sufficient to exactly identify
the model. From the perspective of the model in matrix form, these assumptions







ν,na, where subscript a denotes variables on announcement
or event days and na denotes non-announcement days. The six equations correspond
to the Equation (2.4), with three equations from announcement days and three from
non-announcement days. While the ES methodology solves the identification prob-
lem by assuming a zero restriction to eliminate an unknown, IDH exploits assumed
heteroskedasticity in the structural shocks to add equations.
The validity of the assumption regarding heteroskedasticity is crucial to the iden-
tification scheme and relies upon the division of the full sample of all days into the two
subsamples. In particular, the set of events must be chosen carefully. My selection of
these events is discussed in the next section.
2.3 Selection and Discussion of the Event Set
In this section, I discuss the set of events and how they were chosen. The events
are all announcements made by Chinese officials regarding the future path of Chinese
exchange rate policy or official Treasury purchases. An example of such an event
would be the announcement in July 2005 that the PBOC was revaluing their currency
by 2.1% and dropping a fixed peg in favor a managed float. Another example was the
reassurances by the governor of the PBOC that the PBOC intended to keep buying
Treasuries in spite of market participants’ fears that China was already diversifying
its foreign exchange reserves away from Treasuries and US dollars. Intuitively, these
events are plausibly times when the structural shock to exchange rates is relatively
volatile (relative to other days) and thus the heteroskedasticity assumption is valid.
However, choosing the event set to obtain clean identification requires care and I
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discuss the details in this section. Broadly, I chose the event set with two objectives
in mind: to ensure that the heteroskedasticity assumption is valid and to ensure that
my results do not suffer from sample selection bias.
In order for the heteroskedasticity assumption to be valid, there are three condi-
tions for the events: they must be significant, exogenous, and specific announcements.
The events are significant in the sense that they are announcements by officials in posi-
tions of power (such as the central bank governor and premier) whose views of Chinese
policy are important and the announcements are noteworthy enough to be mentioned
in the popular press. The events must be significant in order for the structural shock
to exhibit higher variance around announcements. If one included announcements by
low-level officials which were not of interest to market participants, then the announce-
ments would not result in shocks to asset prices, and exchange rates in particular.
Including such insignificant announcements in the event set would thus invalidate the
heteroskedasticity assumption. However, simply verifying that exchange rates and
Treasury yields moved significantly in response to the announcements could give rise
to sample selection bias. Thus, I employed an objective rule of searching the PBOC’s
website and the print edition of the Wall Street Journal to determine significance,
and did not use the observed behavior of asset prices in selecting events.
The events are exogenous in that they are announcements about Chinese policy
intentions by government officials which do not appear to be motivated by anticipated
or actual changes in US Treasury yields (or anything correlated with yields) in the
event window. This ensures that the moves in yields observed around announcements
represent true structural policy (or exchange rate or Treasury purchase) shocks, and
not an endogenous response of exchange rates to yield changes. For example, if I
suspected that the PBOC announced a policy change at 7am on Monday anticipat-
ing a shock to Treasury yields expected to arrive at 7:15am, I would exclude this
announcement because it does not appear exogenous. In practice, I did not identify
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any such endogenous events, but the stark example illustrates the requirement of
exogeneity. I also exclude speculation about future Chinese policy by anyone other
than officials who actually decide such policy, as these discussions do not represent
sudden, exogenous changes in publicly available information.3
Finally, the event set includes only announcements which are specific. That is,
I use only announcements which contain clear information about future Chinese ex-
change rate policy or Treasury purchases and which contain little else. The event set
therefore excludes items such as releases of data about the state of the Chinese econ-
omy. These announcements should and do have effects on the expected future path
of Chinese foreign exchange policy, but the announcements contain a great deal of
other information which might plausibly affect exchange rate policy and US Treasury
yields. That is, such events do not represent structural policy shocks.
Having estimated the model, it is possible to verify that the heteroskedasticity
assumption is valid, and it is valid for my set of events. The above three condi-




is larger on announcement days than non-
announcement days.
With the second broad objective in mind, I used an objective rule in generating the
event set in order to avoid sample selection bias. I chose the events by searching the
website of the PBOC for relevant announcements and also performed a keyword search
of printed Wall Street Journal articles referencing news shocks regarding Chinese
exchange rate policy. Of the set of events identified by these searches, I include all
events for which I was able to obtain a measure of the announcement time and which
can be argued to satisfy the three conditions for heteroskedasticity.4
3The one exception to this rule was an article in the New York Times which reported that an
unnamed, high-level source at the PBOC told the New York Times that the PBOC was going to
announce an end to the nearly two-year-old currency peg, initiated in response to the financial crisis,
and announce a new round of currency appreciation. While this report turned out to be untrue,
market participants interpreted the report as coming from the PBOC, so I left it in the event set.
4Of course, some judgment is required here, particularly in assessing the significance of announce-
ments posted to the PBOC’s website (in contrast, I assume anything worthy of publication in the
Wall Street Journal satisfies the significance condition). However, there are very few events for
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Because I will use intraday windows around announcements, I must have infor-
mation regarding the precise time of day at which each announcement reached the
market. For events identified from the PBOC website, this time is provided by the
timestamp on the press release. For events identified from the Wall Street Journal,
this time is taken to be the timestamp on the first Bloomberg article which clearly
mentions the announcement. It appears that the delay in publishing news events
on Bloomberg is typically quite short, on the order of 15 minutes or less. So, this
method yields a reasonable approximation to the announcement time. There were
twelve events identified by searching the Wall Street Journal for which I could not
obtain a precise announcement time; these events are excluded from the set of thirty.
This selection method ensures that my sample does not generate any sample selection
biases. For example, I did not restrict the sample to announcements which were well-
behaved in the sense of yields and exchange rate expectations moving in the expected
manner. The set of events includes all events identified by the above search criteria
for which I was able to obtain precise announcement times.
Finally, I restricted the search for events to the period starting when Chinese
monetary authorities first announced that they were ending their fixed exchange rate
regime on July 21, 2005 and ending on April 30, 2014. I exclude earlier days because
Chinese officials had not previously announced any intention to set the exchange rate
at any level other than the current level of the peg. Thus, there were no exogenous
and specific announcements regarding the future path of policy. Any news regarding
the path must have come from, for example, economic data releases in China or
speculation by market participants, which should be excluded based on the discussion
above. The end date of April 30, 2014 is based on the availability of Treasury futures
data.
Table 2.1, in the next section, lists the date, time, and source of the announce-
which judgment is necessary.
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ments, along with some summary of the data. Brief descriptions of the events are
provided in Appendix A.
2.4 Construction of the Variables
In order to implement the set of six equations based on Equation (2.4) and to solve
for the six unknown model parameters, I must construct the two observed data series:
∆yt and ∆et. There will be one observation for each of the two series on every US
business day from January 1, 2005 through April 30, 2014.
The Treasury yield change series ∆yt is based on yield changes over a one hour
period on each business day. For days on which there is an announcement included in
the event set, that one hour period is centered around the time of the announcement.
For non-announcement days, the center of the window is chosen randomly. I choose
one-hour windows both to ensure that the announcements in my event set are in
fact covered by the window and to allow market participants time to digest the news
in the announcements. Recall that I time many of the events by the timestamp
on Bloomberg articles, which are published with a delay of a few minutes, leading
to slight imprecision with event timing. Windows as small as 30 minutes do not
substantially change the results but do risk leaving some announcements outside the
windows. Larger windows appear undesirable, as they only serve to add noise to the
measured impacts of announcements.
The yields used to compute yield changes are taken from the soonest-to-expire
(“front”) Treasury note and bond futures. I use data from the futures market, rather
than the spot market, because Treasury futures are traded on an electronic exchange
at the Chicago Board of Trade (now the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). As a re-
sult, I can obtain prices for standardized contracts at high frequency, even overnight.
Obtaining overnight data is particularly important, as many of the announcements
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occur during business hours in China, which is overnight in the US. Over the counter
spot markets are extraordinarily thinly traded overnight, meaning there would be
very little pricing data from the spot market precisely when I need such data.
The particular Treasury futures contracts I use are what are referred to as the
5- and 10-year Treasury note futures and 30-year Treasury bond futures, but each
contract typically corresponds to a security shorter than its name would suggest. This
arises because the settlement practices of the futures contracts allow for delivery of a
variety of securities with a range of maturities and coupon rates. To ensure that the
short investor does not always deliver the lowest-priced eligible security, the settlement
practices employ a conversion factor invoicing system to standardize the value of the
eligible securities. If the invoicing system worked perfectly, the short investor would
be indifferent among all eligible securities. In practice, the system is imperfect, and
certain securities tend to emerge as the “cheapest-to-deliver.” Typically, the cheapest-
to-deliver security on any contract is the eligible security with the shortest duration.
Thus, the maturity of the delivered security is typically on the lower end of the eligible
maturity range, meaning that the 5-year futures contract corresponds more closely to
something like a 4.5-year note, the 10-year futures contract to a 7-year note, and the
30-year futures contract to a bond with around 15 to 17 years remaining to maturity.
Having noted that the futures naming convention may be slightly misleading, I will
ignore this confusion henceforth. I will use the three measures of Treasury yields
separately, implementing independent models for each.
For each of the three Treasury futures contracts, I calculate the yield change














where δ is the modified duration of the security which was cheapest-to-deliver into
the September 2014 contract as of mid-June 2014. While using the duration of the
cheapest-to-deliver security on any given contract and day over the entire sample is
desirable, the added complication has minimal impact on the results. I express the
yield changes in basis points unless noted otherwise.
Now consider the second data series I need, ∆et. As discussed in Section 2.1, I em-
ploy a novel proxy for surprise foreign official Treasury purchases using exchange rate
surprises. I construct the exchange rate surprise as the one-day change in US Dollar
(USD)/Renminbi (RMB) forward currency rates. Under the plausible assumption
that the value of USD/RMB exchange rate peg is proportional to expected Chinese
official Treasury purchases, I have constructed a proxy for surprises to expected Trea-
sury purchases.
Such a proportional relationship might hold between the two variables in a model
with a stable equilibrium exchange rate; in which Chinese authorities held only Trea-
sury securities as foreign exchange reserves; and in which the dollar value of foreign
exchange interventions exhibited a stable relationship with the deviation of the ex-
change rate from equilibrium. In such a model, if Chinese authorities wanted to de-
preciate their currency by X% relative to the equilibrium exchange rate, they would
purchase $Y of Treasury securities. In that case, there is a clear proportionality
between the pegged level of the exchange rate and official Treasury purchases.
Assuming such a model invites at least two criticisms, but the new surprise vari-
able is still reasonable. First, the equilibrium exchange rate surely varies through
time, although it is never actually observed in the case of China because Chinese
authorities are apparently pegging their currency at a level other than equilibrium.
However, the expected equilibrium exchange rate likely does not change significantly
over a single day around announcements regarding foreign exchange interventions,
so the first assumption is reasonable in this context. Second, Treasury securities are
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not the only asset Chinese authorities hold as foreign exchange reserves. They do,
however, represent the majority of Chinese foreign exchange reserves. The actual
figures are kept secret, but estimates suggest Treasury securities and close dollar-
denominated substitutes (such as Agency and highly-rated corporate debt) represent
around two-thirds of total Chinese foreign exchange reserves and almost all of the
dollar-denominated assets held by Chinese authorities (Setser and Pandey (2009)).
Given that, if Chinese authorities announce a change in their future dollar purchases
or in the path of the USD/RMB exchange rate, we should expect this to entail system-
atic changes in future purchases of Treasury securities (or close substitutes). Whether
Chinese authorities change their purchases of only Treasuries or of both Treasuries
and Agencies is of little importance, given the close substitutability of these assets (for
evidence of this substitutability, see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)).
Thus, the new surprise variable constructed in this paper is a reasonable, if not ideal,
measure of the surprise contained in Chinese policy announcements.
Summarizing, I use the exchange rates on the last 1-week, 3-month, and 12-month
non-deliverable forward (NDF) contracts5 traded on each day that US markets are
open to generate the surprise variable. The variable is constructed as the log-change
between the market close before the announcement to the market close after the
announcement and expressed in basis points:
log
(




Plast market close before event
)
.
This means that I construct three different measures of the surprise, one corresponding
to each contract (or expectation) horizon. Finally, the use of market-close data means
that the smallest event window available in the NDF data is one day. Although it
would obviously be desirable to use higher frequency NDF data, none is available.
5The contracts are traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, where, being outside of mainland
China, Chinese currency is non-deliverable due to capital account restrictions. Thus, the contracts
are net-settled in US dollars. Hence the name “non-deliverable forward” (NDF).
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Currency prices are quoted as the RMB price of a USD, so a rise in the exchange rate
is a weakening of the RMB and strengthening of the USD. Using the three measures
of the surprise (corresponding to the three NDF horizons) means that there are three
independent models for each of the three independent measures of yields, discussed
above. As a result, I estimate nine independent models corresponding to all pairings
of the three yields and three surprises.
Table 2.1 presents the set of thirty events, discussed in the above section, and
presents the change in the Treasury yields and exchange rates at varying horizons.
The “Time” column refers to the time in Chicago, rounded to the nearest 5 minute
interval, and the “Source” column names the agency which made the announcement
(or the agency at which the official who spoke works). “Ant. ∆i” gives the direction
in which conventional theory and common sense would suggest Treasury interest rates
should move in response to the news. The next three columns give the change in the
interest rate implied by Treasury futures prices for 5-, 10-, and 30-year Treasuries.
The last three columns give the change currency forward rates at the 1-week, 3-
month, and 12-month horizon, expressed in basis points (so that an entry of “100”
corresponds to a 1% change, say from 7 to 7.07).
Focusing first on changes in Treasury yields, this table seems to indicate that
when the PBOC says something concrete about its peg or its purchases of dollar-
assets, Treasury prices respond in the predicted direction, although only by very
small amounts (quite possibly owing to the fact the news events contain small amounts
of news, particularly relative to the size of the Treasury market). Not surprisingly,
markets do not seem to react as strongly when someone other than the PBOC speaks.
Focusing now on the joint behavior of Treasury yields and currency futures, it
appears that an increase in expected future Chinese official purchases of Treasuries
decreases Treasury yields (and vice versa). Because the exchange rate is expressed
as the price of one USD in RMB, an appreciation of the RMB is a decrease in the
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exchange rate. This means that if news arrives suggesting the PBOC will allow the
RMB to appreciate by more than the market previously expected, currency forward
rates should decline. At the same time, market participants should expect the PBOC
to buy fewer Treasury bonds going forward, meaning the price of Treasury bonds
(in spot or futures markets) should decline and Treasury yields should rise. That
is, if the announcements are the driving factor in these financial markets during the
event windows, we should expect a negative correlation between Treasury yield and
currency forward changes. Indeed, yields and exchange rates are negatively correlated
over the set of thirty events.
To summarize before moving on to the results, I use the two reduced-form variance-
covariance matrices of the two data series discussed in this section (one each from the
two subsamples of the data) to generate six equations according to Equation (2.4)
and solve those equations to obtain point estimates of the model parameters. This
exercise is repeated for nine different models composed of each possible pairing of
the three Treasury futures and three currency forward contracts. The results of this
exercise are discussed next.
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∆i (bp) ∆NDF (bp)
Date Time Source Ant.∆i 5yr 10yr 30yr 1W 3M 12M
7/21/05 0600 PBOC ↑ 4.7 5.2 4.2 -212.6 -225.1 -37.2
7/26/05 0330 PBOC ↓ -.7 -.2 -.5 1.0 12.5 12.9
9/9/05 1305 PBOC ↑ 1.3 .7 .5 2.8 5.6 12.7
11/25/05 0610 PBOC ↓ .7 .7 .5 5.8 14.8 41.2
1/5/06 0605 SAFE ↑ -.3 -.9 -.7 -17.1 0 -27.9
11/10/06 1450 PBOC ↓ -.3 .2 .5 -3.2 -7.7 -25.1
1/20/07 0445 Premier ↑ 0* .2* 0* .3* -4.3* -1.1*
3/8/07 2155 Fin.Min. ↑ .3 0 -.3 11.6 9.8 -9.5
3/15/07 2235 Premier ↓ .7 .5 .5 -15.5 -25.9 -28.8
3/20/07 2150 PBOC ↑ -.3 0 -.3 -4.8 -5.9 -11.0
11/6/07 2120 Adv. ↑ .3 .5 .5 -15.5 -20.5 -14.4
7/27/08 0600 PBOC ↓ 0* .7* 0* 25.9* 32.9* 92.7*
3/23/09 0210 PBOC ↓ -2.6 -3.6 -3.6 2.5 -1.5 -30.6
3/23/09 0445 PBOC ↑ -1.4 -2.4 -1.1 2.5 -1.5 -30.6
6/26/09 0450 PBOC ↑ -.8 -.6 -1.1 0 -2.6 -4.1
3/8/10 2020 SAFE ↓ .3 .2 0 2.2 5.9 -1.5
4/8/10 0355 NYT ↑ .8 .2 -.2 -13.2 -37.7 -32.5
4/12/10 1955 Premier ↑ -.5 -.6 -.7 5.9 20.0 14.6
5/10/10 2015 PBOC ↑ .9 .6 .5 2.2 -5.9 -1.5
5/27/10 0210 SAFE ↑ -.9 -.8 -.7 -4.7 -19.1 -59.9
6/19/10 0600 PBOC ↑ 6.3* 6.5* 4.8* -25.7* -67.3* -98.1*
7/3/10 0305 PBOC ↓ -1.2* -.4* -.7* -1.5* 5.9* 13.5*
3/14/11 2250 Premier ↑ -.8 -1.0 -1.2 -2.3 24.5 4.7
10/11/11 2040 PBOC ↑ -.3 0 -.2 3.9 -3.1 -4.7
2/3/12 0305 Premier ↑ .6 .6 .6 -.8 0 -4.0
3/6/12 0335 CIC ↑ 0 -.8 -1.0 14.3 23.0 39.2
3/11/12 2245 PBOC ↓ 0 0 0 30.9 34.8 37.3
8/30/12 0010 Premier ↑ .1 .4 .2 0 2.8 2.3
5/6/13 0605 Premier ↑ .4 .6 1.0 6.1 11.3 27.3
11/19/13 0210 PBOC ↑ 0 0 .2 -6.5 -10.6 -16.8
Table 2.1: Brief Description of the Event Set. Events are in chronological order, with
the source of the announcement (broadly); the anticipated effect of the announcement
on bond yields; the measured change in bond yields for futures contracts on Treasury
bonds of three maturities within a centered one-hour event window; and the mea-
sured change in USD/RMB NDF prices for different contract settlement horizons.
Asterisks denote events that occurred while the Treasury futures market was closed.
See Appendix A for brief descriptions of the events.
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2.5 Results
The combination of the model, identification technique, and high frequency data
discussed above gives improved estimates of the effects of foreign official purchases of
Treasuries. These results indicate that the effects are generally larger than previous
research has found. I show that the impacts of Chinese official Treasury purchases
are economically and statistically significant in Section 2.5.1, and also emphasize
that the results are qualitatively consistent with economic intuition and benchmark
theoretical models. In section 2.5.2, I use my estimates to approximate the total
impact of the Chinese exchange rate peg on Treasury yields and Section 2.5.3 shows
that my estimates of the impacts of official purchases on yields are generally larger
than those in the existing literature. Finally, Section 2.5.4 provides evidence that
traditional event study methods are not adequate to overcome the endogeneity bias
in this case and that this paper’s use of IDH meaningfully improves the results,
especially for surprises at the 12-month horizon.
Before discussing the results, however, it is worth noting that there are essentially
two parameters of interest from the model. First, there is the slope parameter α from
Equation (2.2). This parameter measures the sensitivity of yields to exchange rates
and is the only parameter which can be estimated in the single equation ES model. As
such, it is the coefficient α which I will discuss in Section 2.5.4. A second, potentially
more interesting parameter obtained from the two equation model in Equation (2.4)
is the estimate of the impulse response of yields to exchange rates.6 The impulse
response estimate will take into account the simultaneity modeled in Equation (2.4).
Because I am interested in the full impact of policy shocks, I will focus on the impulse
response coefficients wherever possible, which is in Sections 2.5.1 through 2.5.3.
6Note that because the model is of lag order zero, the impulse response is zero at all horizons
other than in the period of the shock. Nonetheless, this is an impulse response function in the
traditional VAR sense.
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Note that the impulse response of yields to a one basis point shock to exchange
rates is not α. If exchange rates rise by one basis point, the impact on yields is α,
but this change in yields further affects exchanges rates by the amount αβ, which
again affects yields, and so on. Thus, the impulse response of yields to a one basis
point exchange rate/policy shock, will be given by α
1−αβ , the parameter in the lower
left corner of the rotation matrix in Equation (2.3). Note that the impulse response
of the exchange rate to a one basis point exchange rate shock is not one, but is
rather 1
1−αβ , the off-diagonal parameter in the rotation matrix in Equation (2.3). In
discussing impulse responses below, I normalize the exchange rate shock such that
the impulse response of exchange rates to their own shock is 100 basis points. This
makes the discussion more intuitive and is consistent with common practice in the
VAR literature to report impulse responses in this manner. With this normalization,
which scales up the structural shock and its impact by a factor of 100 × (1 − αβ),
the impulse response of yields to an exchange rate/policy shock turns out to 100×α.
Estimates of this parameter are shown in Table 2.2.
2.5.1 Impulse Response Estimates
My results indicate that foreign official capital flows substantially depress Treasury
yields. Table 2.2 reports the contemporaneous impulse responses of yields to exchange
rates in each of the nine possible models corresponding to Equation (2.4). Each of
the nine models corresponds to a pairing of a Treasury futures contract (5-, 10-, or
30-year contract) with a currency forward contract (at the 1-week, 3-month, or 12-
month horizon). As an example of the substantial size of the impacts I estimate, a 100
basis point surprise depreciation of the expected exchange rate 3 months in the future
(such as a change from 7 to 7.07 yuan per dollar) would decrease 10-year Treasury
futures-implied yields by 2.83 basis points. A similar surprise at the 12-month horizon
would decrease such yields by 5.67 basis points. These effects are modest, but so is
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the exchange rate surprise. For comparison, consider that over the sample period of
January 2005 to April 2014, the 12-month-ahead expected USD/RMB exchange rate
appreciated by about 22% versus the dollar.7 The model implemented here suggests
that a surprise of that magnitude, if it occurred in a single day, would give rise to
a total increase in 10-year Treasury futures-implied yields of 125 basis points. Of
course, there was no single surprise of such magnitude, but it illustrates the point
that the estimated impacts of surprises are large.
The impacts of exchange rate surprises on yields are all statistically significantly
negative. Table 2.2 reports standard errors formed using the Delta Method applied
to the Newey-West HAC estimator of the reduced form variance-covariance matrix
with a lag length of 40 days.8 These standard errors indicate that nearly all of the
coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level.
The results are qualitatively consistent with economic theory and intuition along
two dimensions.9 First, Table 2.2 indicates that exchange rate surprises at longer
horizons have larger effects than surprises at short horizons. This is illustrated in the
example above in which a surprise in 12-month-ahead expectations has an effect on
10-year futures twice as large as a 3-month-ahead surprise. This finding is consistent
with the idea that surprises at longer horizons correspond to larger policy shifts, such
as the change from a fixed to a managed floating regime. Such policy shifts correspond
to large changes in expected future Treasury purchases, and thus should affect prices
and yields to a greater extent. On the other hand, surprises at the 1-week horizon
are more likely to represent short-term variation in policy, which would correspond
7Recall that these percent changes are approximated by log changes.
8The standard errors are not sensitive to the lag length chosen, and 40 was chosen based on the
author’s judgment.
9While theory and intuition give clear qualitative implications for the impacts of Treasury pur-
chases on yields, such sources generally do not give clear quantitative implications. Indeed, this
paper is part of a growing literature attempting to address this shortcoming of the theory. Given
the lack of quantitative clarity on the impacts of purchases, I focus here on the qualitative impli-
cations of theory and then provide quantitative comparisons with the existing empirical literature
below.
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to smaller changes to the path of expected future Treasury purchases.
The results also indicate that surprises have larger effects on yields at the middle
of the yield curve, where foreign officials are known to have the largest holdings.
The average maturity of foreign official holdings over the sample period is between
3.5 and 4 years, though officials hold large quantities of securities out to about 10
years to maturity. The precise data on foreign official holdings by country is not
publicly available, but analysts generally believe the PBOC is representative of foreign
officials. Further, assuming the average maturity of the foreign official portfolio is
roughly constant, which it appears it is, the average maturity of purchases must
be greater than the average maturity of holdings to offset the aging of the existing
holdings. Given that, ad hoc intuition and preferred habitat term structure models
would suggest surprises to the expected path of Chinese official purchases should have
larger impacts on yields in the 3 to 10 year range. Indeed, the estimates in Table 2.2
are consistent with this conjecture.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the estimates in Table 2.2 cannot be used
jointly. This is because they were generated by nine separate models with one yield
and one surprise variable in each. Thus, we can imagine a hypothetical scenario in
which the PBOC announces on a given day that it will appreciate its currency today,
say from 7 yuan per dollar to 6.3. If the peg before and after the announcement is
credible and expected to last forever, this would correspond to a 1,000 basis point
(10%) surprise to exchange rate expectations at all horizons. However, we cannot
sensibly sum up the effects of such a surprise at each of the three horizons to obtain
the total effect of the policy shift on any given yield. As Table 2.1 suggests, surprises
at each horizon are likely to be correlated with one another. This means that in
regressions with only one surprise, the coefficient on that surprise may be larger than
it otherwise would be, reflecting omitted variable bias that captures the effects of




5-year Treasury future -2.51*** -2.69*** -4.94**
(0.52) (0.85) (2.03)
10-year Treasury future -2.69*** -2.83*** -5.67**
(0.51) (0.81) (2.33)
30-year Treasury future -2.16*** -2.24*** -5.42***
(0.36) (0.56) (2.06)
Table 2.2: Impulse Responses of Treasury Yields to Exchange Rate Surprises. The
contemporaneous impulse response of Treasury yields to a 1% (100bp) surprise ex-
change rate depreciation, expressed in basis points. ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance
at 99% level and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 95% level, based upon Newey-West
HAC standard errors. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses.
2.5.2 Measuring the Total Impact of the Chinese Exchange
Rate Peg on Yields
The total impact of the Chinese exchange rate peg on US interest rates of is of clear
interest to economists, and this paper can provide estimates of this figure. There
are potentially multiple ways in which one could leverage the results of this paper to
estimate the total impact of the Chinese currency peg on US yields, and I will present
one approach. In this section, I consider the hypothetical scenario in which the PBOC
announced on the last day of May 2005 that it was dropping the exchange rate peg and
allowing its currency to move to its equilibrium, free-floating value. I chose May 2005
because this was during the period of large Chinese Treasury purchases accompanied
by low US interest rates. Since the stylized fact of low interest rates in the 2000s
is one of the main motivating factors for this literature, May 2005 seems a natural
choice. The results of this hypothetical exercise will provide a rough measure of the
total impact of the Chinese currency peg and they will also allow comparison of my
estimates of the impacts of policy surprises (measured in exchange rates) with other
estimates from the literature (measured directly but at lower frequency, as actual
Treasury purchase surprises). The comparison with the literature is considered in the
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next section.
Translating the results from the impacts of relatively small policy shifts, mea-
sured in terms of exchange rate surprises at multiple horizons, to the hypothetical
revaluation scenario will require several assumptions. First, I must assume that the
estimate for the effect of an exchange rate surprise at one horizon will proxy suffi-
ciently well for a surprise all horizons. As discussed above, each impulse response
estimate is generated from a model corresponding to the exchange rate surprise at
one horizon and presumably includes some omitted variable bias, capturing the im-
pact of correlated exchange rate surprises at all horizons. Second, I must assume a
reasonable size of the exchange rate surprise for the hypothetical scenario. To that
end, Cline and Williamson (2008) summarize thirteen published studies which esti-
mate the degree to which the RMB was undervalued against the dollar in real terms.
Although I am concerned instead with a nominal exchange rate, I assume that the
ratio of price levels remains constant so that proportional changes are the same for
real and nominal rates (estimates of nominal undervaluation are scarce). Each of the
summarized studies estimate the undervaluation for particular, but different, points
in time between 2000 and 2007. The estimates for the RMB appreciation required to
restore equilibrium range from 7% to 100% and average to 40%, with no trend up or
down over the period of the estimates. To summarize the differing estimates, I will
consider three revaluations: 7%, 40%, and 67%. Third, I will assume that the new,
revalued exchange rate is expected to last indefinitely. This assumption implies that
the spot and all forward exchange rates instantaneously jump from wherever they are
on the last day of May 2005 to the new level of the spot exchange rate implied by the
assumed revaluations of 7%, 40%, and 67%. Because some modest appreciation was
apparently anticipated in late May 2005, the appreciation in forward exchange rates
in each of the three scenarios is actually less than the appreciation in the spot rate.
With these assumptions in hand, I estimate economically substantial total impacts
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7% Revaluation
1-week NDF 3-month NDF 12-month NDF
5-year Treasury future 17 14 7
10-year Treasury future 18 15 8
30-year Treasury future 14 12 8
40% Revaluation
1-week NDF 3-month NDF 12-month NDF
5-year Treasury future 84 87 140
10-year Treasury future 90 91 160
30-year Treasury future 73 72 153
67% Revaluation
1-week NDF 3-month NDF 12-month NDF
5-year Treasury future 129 134 227
10-year Treasury future 138 141 260
30-year Treasury future 111 112 249
Table 2.3: Estimated Impacts of the Chinese Currency Peg. Impacts of revaluation
surprises in each of three currency forwards on each of three Treasury yields, in basis
points, for three different sizes of revaluation.
of the Chinese currency peg (Table 2.3). In the baseline case, suppose that achieving
the equilibrium exchange rate required an instantaneous 40% appreciation of the spot
rate, and further assume that all forward rates instantly jump to this new level of
the spot rate. My estimates of the impact of exchange rate surprises indicate that
the 5-year Treasury yield would jump by 84 to 140 basis points, the 10-year yield
would jump by 90-160 basis points, and the 30-year by 73 to 153 basis points. The
range of estimates for each yield arises because surprises at the 1-week, 3-month, and
12-month horizon each generate a different estimated impact. Generally, surprises at
longer horizons generate larger impacts. Table 2.3 also shows the smaller impacts of
a 7% revaluation and the larger impacts of a 67% revaluation.
These impacts are sufficiently large that foreign demand (and even just demand
from Chinese official institutions) could explain the period of low long-term interest
rates in the mid-2000s. Indeed, these estimated impacts are larger than existing es-
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timates of the extent to which yields were “too low” in the mid-2000s. In particular,
Bernanke et al (2004) and Rudebusch et al (2006) estimate empirical term structure
models that control for standard macroeconomic variables such as the stance of mon-
etary policy and inflation, producing commonly-cited heuristic measures of the degree
to which yields were unusually low. They find that the 10-year Treasury yield in the
mid-2000s was lower than might be expected by about 50-80 basis points, depend-
ing upon the particular point in time and model used. This range is often cited as
the discrepancy which needs to be explained, perhaps by foreign official demand for
Treasury securities. My estimates suggest that Chinese official demand alone could
account for this discrepancy, ignoring other foreign buyers of Treasuries. Thus, by my
estimates, total foreign demand would have an even larger impact on Treasury yields,
though by how much is unclear. China was the single largest buyer of Treasury secu-
rities at the time, having represented about 40% of all net foreign Treasury purchases
in the 12-month period to May 2005. Nearly all Chinese Treasury purchases should
be official purchases, given China’s closed capital account, though precise estimates
of the official share of the Chinese purchases are not available. Further, a significant
portion of the remaining 60% of foreign purchases in the 12 months to May 2005 are
private purchases, which might be expected to have a smaller impact on yields due
to the greater demand elasticity of private buyers (Beltran et al (2013)). Finally, it is
worth noting that the impact effects that I estimate need not equal the impacts over
longer horizons. Indeed, Abe (2007) implements an event study and estimates smaller
initial impacts than I do, but also finds that the impacts tend to attenuate as time
progresses. Nonetheless, my estimates suggest that Chinese demand for Treasuries
substantially depressed yields during the mid-2000s, and more generally that foreign
demand for Treasuries has large impacts on Treasury prices and yields.
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2.5.3 Comparison with Estimates from the Literature
The hypothetical scenario in the previous section allows me to compare the magni-
tude of my results with those from the existing literature. Outside the context of the
above hypothetical scenario, direct comparison with the existing literature is diffi-
cult, because this paper estimates the impacts of policy surprises measured in terms
of exchange rate changes. The existing literature considers the impacts of actual
Treasury purchases, either in dollar terms or as a share of marketable Treasuries, so
some method of translation between exchange rates and dollars is needed.10 If I add
one assumption to those needed for the above scenario, I can make that translation.
In particular, I assume that Chinese purchases of Treasuries would be zero if their
exchange rate were at its equilibrium value. That assumption allows me to provide
a dollar figure for Treasury purchases arising from the Chinese currency peg. I al-
ready have a measure of the exchange rate surprise corresponding to the peg, so I am
now able to translate between the two. Of course, assuming Chinese official Treasury
purchases would go to zero is a strong assumption, as some Chinese official Treasury
purchases likely reflect high private savings in China being mediated through the of-
ficial sector due to the closed capital account. Such purchases may not vanish in the
absence of the peg. If purchases were to remain positive with the end of the peg, the
dollar value of purchases would change less in response to the end of the peg, and the
existing literature would suggest smaller impacts of the peg on yields than discussed
below.
Comparing my results with those from the literature, this paper finds generally
larger impacts of purchases. Based on the results in Table 2.3 for the baseline case
of a 40% appreciation, I will take 100 basis points to be this paper’s benchmark
impact of the Chinese peg on all three yields. I first compare my results with the
10Of, course there are several other issues with comparison, but I largely ignore these complications
for the purposes of this discussion. For instance, my estimates are for intradaily yield changes, while
many papers in the literature are for monthly yield changes.
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four existing papers which estimate the impacts of 12-month accumulated Treasury
purchases on yields at the monthly frequency. First, Warnock and Warnock (2009)
estimate that $100 billion dollars of accumulated official purchases depress 10-year
Treasury yields by 68 basis points. Given that total Chinese purchases in the 12
month period to May 2005 were about $80 billion and assuming all Chinese purchases
were official purchases11 undertaken to maintain the peg, this suggests Warnock and
Warnock estimate impacts of about 55 basis points in the scenario. This estimate is
below my benchmark of 100 basis points, though within the range of estimates if the
appreciation needed to reach equilibrium is less than 40%. One might assume that
Warnock and Warnock would estimate relatively small impacts given that they do
not use an identification scheme, arguably biasing their results toward zero. However,
Warnock and Warnock’s findings are not small relative to the rest of the literature.
Similar calculations suggest that Beltran et al (2013) estimate impacts of 30-50 basis
points on the 5-year yield in a model identified by instrumental variables. Again,
this is smaller than my benchmark impact of the scenario. Third, Chapter 1 of
this dissertation uses sign identification in a VAR to estimate that the scenario would
increase 5-year yields by about 75 basis points and the 10-year yield by about 60 basis
points. However, the sign identification procedure yields wide confidence intervals
that easily overlap the ranges in this paper, so this chapter and the previous find
estimates of a broadly similar magnitude. Finally, Rudebusch et al (2006) estimate
that foreign Treasury purchases have negligible impact on yields, though their result
is an outlier in the literature.
Additionally, there are a couple of higher frequency studies to consider which
estimate effects a bit smaller than mine. Bernanke et al (2004) estimate effects
of about 55 basis points from a daily ES model for the case of Japanese official
interventions in the early 2000s. Lastly, McCauley and Jiang (2004) use weekly
11Data on official Treasury purchases by China is not publicly available, though China’s closed
capital account would suggest nearly all Chinese Treasury purchases were official purchases.
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capital flows data and find effects a bit larger than most of the literature and on the
lower end of my estimates, in the neighborhood of 80 basis points.
Thus, this paper finds impacts which are generally larger than in the existing lit-
erature, arguably because the use of IDH allows me to overcome the endogeneity bias
discussed in Section 2.1. It is worth noting that Table 2.4 indicates that endogeneity
is present and does indeed bias incompletely identified estimates toward zero.
2.5.4 Comparison with Event Study Estimates
As a final exercise, I compare the estimates of α from IDH with the estimates gener-
ated by simple ES methods. This comparison suggests that ES methods appear not
to adequately identify the models which include surprises measured at the 12-month
horizon. The first two columns in Table 2.4 show that IDH produces meaningfully
different estimates of the coefficients than ES. In all cases, the estimates of α are
larger in absolute value (more negative) when estimated by IDH. For surprises at the
12-month horizon, the differences are very large and statistically significant. Signif-
icance is assessed using the Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis that the
ES identifying assumption from Section 2.2.1 is true (and thus both the ES and IDH
estimators of α are consistent, but ES is efficient) against the alternative that the ES
identifying assumption is violated (in which case the IDH estimator is consistent and
the ES estimator is not).
This finding suggests that simple ES methodology is an inadequate treatment for
endogeneity in this case. That is, I would argue that the ES estimates of the coef-
ficients are closer to zero because of remaining endogeneity bias. Indeed, I estimate
that β from Equation (2.2) is positive in all models, which means that endogeneity
bias in the ES estimates should be positive, biasing those estimates toward zero. It
is worth noting here that Rigobon and Sack (2004) present similar findings regarding
bias in ES estimates of the impacts of US monetary policy shocks on various asset
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Treasury future NDF IDH ES Hausman Test
5-year Treasury future 1-week NDF -2.51*** -2.39*** 0.11
(0.52) (0.34)
5-year Treasury future 3-month NDF -2.69*** -2.43*** 0.17
(0.85) (0.57)
5-year Treasury future 12-month NDF -4.94** -1.78 4.91†
(2.03) (1.43)
10-year Treasury future 1-week NDF -2.69*** -2.57*** 0.10
(0.51) (0.34)
10-year Treasury future 3-month NDF -2.83*** -2.58*** 0.18
(0.81) (0.56)
10-year Treasury future 12-month NDF -5.67** -1.53 6.60†
(2.33) (1.66)
Treasury bond future 1-week NDF -2.16*** -2.10*** 0.07
(0.36) (0.26)
Treasury bond future 3-month NDF -2.24*** -2.10*** 0.16
(0.56) (0.43)
Treasury bond future 12-month NDF -5.42*** -1.31 6.16†
(2.06) (1.20)
Table 2.4: Comparing IDH and ES Estimates of α. All parameters are scaled up by
a factor of 100 to eliminate zeros. ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes statistical significance at 99% level
and ∗∗ denotes significance at the 95% level, based upon Newey-West HAC standard
errors. Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. Rightmost column shows
the Hausman test statistic assessing the significance of the difference between the




This paper provides new evidence indicating that the effects of foreign official pur-
chases are quite large. By creating a novel measure of the surprise contained in Chi-
nese policy announcements, employing high frequency data, and using the method of
identification by heteroskedasticity, I produce new estimates of the effects of Chinese
official purchases of Treasuries. In so doing, I overcome endogeneity bias present
in the existing empirical literature. This endogeneity biases the estimates in other
papers toward zero, so that I find quantitatively larger effects than most previous
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work. I estimate that Chinese purchases of Treasury securities made in the pursuit
of exchange rate goals depressed 10-year Treasury rates by perhaps 100 basis points,
though some smaller or substantially larger impacts are possible. The effects on 5-
year Treasury yields are comparable and the effect on 30-year yields is estimated to
be a bit smaller.
These results offer insights into a couple of ongoing debates in economics. First,
there has been considerable discussion of the period of unusually low long-term inter-
est rates in the US during the mid-2000s, often referred to as the bond-yield “conun-
drum” (beginning with Greenspan (2005)). Many observers have cited foreign official
purchases as a major cause of the conundrum. However, the empirical work on the
topic has yet to conclude that this is the case, because of widely varying estimates
of the impacts of purchases on yields and because of probable endogeneity bias in
many of those studies. My results indicate that foreign official Treasury purchases
played a larger role in the conundrum than most other papers find and that foreign
demand can explain the conundrum. Additionally, I provide evidence of endogeneity
bias in event study estimates of the impacts and argue that many existing studies
suffer from endogeneity bias. This paper can also contribute to the large and grow-
ing literature on the effects of LSAPs. My results suggest that an official institution
(be it the PBOC or the Fed) can have a large impact on Treasury yields by buying
Treasury securities in large quantities. There are certainly reasons to believe that
Treasury purchases in the context of quantitative easing might have different effects
than purchases in pursuit of an exchange rate peg, but my results still indicate that
quantitative easing is effective.
Finally, these results suggest that foreign official institutions have the ability to sig-
nificantly affect credit conditions in the US, so that as global capital markets continue
to become more integrated, the Federal Reserve will have to act more aggressively
to offset foreign influence. This finding is crucial to the conduct of monetary policy.
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Indeed, some commentators argue that credit conditions were loose during the mid-
2000s due to the influence of foreign official institutions, in spite of the fact that the
Federal Reserve was raising short-term interest rates. These commentators suggest
that the loose credit conditions may have fueled asset price bubbles (for example, in
long-term interest rate-sensitive sectors like housing) which burst during the financial
crisis. Clearly, understanding the effect of foreign official purchases of Treasury secu-
rities is important for the effective conduct of monetary policy. This paper provides
new insight on this topic.
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CHAPTER 3
Extracting Treasury Flows as a Latent Variable
3.1 Introduction
Economists and financial market participants are keenly interested in international fi-
nancial flows. Analysts are especially interested in foreign activity in the US Treasury
market, both because of the importance of the Treasury market and because foreign-
ers are such large participants in the market. Foreigners have owned more than half
of the stock of Treasury notes and bonds in the hands of the public over much of
the past decade. In monitoring and studying foreign activity in the Treasury market,
analysts rely on a variety of data sources to reveal exactly how many Treasury secu-
rities foreigners are buying or holding and the value of those securities. Regardless of
the particular source, there are arguably three critical qualities of the data on foreign
purchases on which all analysts agree. Ideally, the data would be accurate, available
in a timely manner, and available at high frequency. The argument for accuracy is
obvious.
Timely data is important to help market participants and policymakers under-
stand what is occurring in real time, and the interest in timely data is revealed
routinely in the financial press. For example, when foreigners appear to be selling
Treasury securities, analysts and the press are quick to take note and express concern
about the risk of higher US interest rates if the sales continue (See Johnson (2013)
and Zeng (2014)). Similarly, when foreign officials appear to be buying Treasuries, US
officials are quick to express concern about official intervention in foreign exchange
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markets (Chandler (2014) and US Department of the Treasury (2014)). Unfortu-
nately, timeliness in Treasury purchases data has typically come at the expense of
accuracy. Accurate weekly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York covers
only a fraction of the total foreign activity in the Treasury market and more com-
prehensive monthly measures of net foreign purchases are known to exhibit several
errors and biases. Comprehensive, high quality data is available only at the annual
frequency and with a substantial delay (Bertaut and Tryon (2007)).1
Finally, analysts also benefit from the availability of high-frequency data. As men-
tioned above, there is partial data on foreign purchases and holdings available at the
weekly frequency, but comprehensive data is only available at the monthly frequency
or less. Economic analysis would benefit from data at higher frequencies than are
currently available. For instance, event studies on the impacts of foreign purchases of
Treasuries on Treasury yields could use a more complete measure of foreign purchases
at the daily frequency. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) and Abe (2007) con-
duct event studies on the impact on Treasury yields of Japanese Ministry of Finance
Treasury purchases in the early 2000s because the Ministry of Finance reports its pur-
chases at the daily frequency. Lacking such high frequency data for other purchasers
or time periods, these event studies must focus on Japanese purchases over a short
period of time. Clearly, regardless of the frequency, economic research also demands
that the data be accurate and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, timely.
In order to improve the accuracy of data on Treasury flows, to improve the trade-
off between accuracy and timeliness, and to provide a high-frequency (daily) measure
of flows, this paper uses the Kalman Filter to construct a new measure of net cross-
border Treasury flows. I model Treasury flows as comprised of two unobserved daily
1The marginal cost of timeliness in terms of accuracy has fallen somewhat in the past eighteen
months with the introduction of a newer, apparently more reliable survey methodology by the
Treasury, but the point remains that there are a variety of timely but potentially misleading sources
of information on foreign Treasury purchases and these sources often disagree meaningfully with
one another. Warnock (2010) includes a discussion of a particularly remarkable example of such a
disagreement.
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series: purchases of Treasury securities (“outright” purchases or sales) and valuation
changes on the stock of foreign holdings (valuation flows). The unobserved series
are then extracted from several mixed-frequency, noisy, observed data series. The
observed data I use include two different monthly series from the Treasury Interna-
tional Capital (TIC) database, an annual series from TIC, daily exchange rate data,
and daily Treasury yield data (combined with information on the duration of foreign
holdings, taken from TIC).
This approach improves upon the available data along all three dimensions dis-
cussed above. First, it offers an accurate description of Treasury flows and foreign
Treasury holdings in the sense that it is consistent (within the context of a statistical
framework) with the available, relevant data series. Ultimately, because we do not
observe the true data, accuracy is difficult to assess. However, the series extracted in
this paper conform to a reasonable and well-understood time series model, match the
behavior of the most trusted annual data on foreign purchases, and behave similarly
(though with some informative deviations) to the currently most trusted monthly
series.2 Second, this paper improves the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy.
I am able to provide estimates for flows and foreign holdings extrapolating forward
from the most recent annual survey (unlike previous practices) and the estimates
reflect information from a greater number of observed time series than previous es-
timates. Finally, my approach produces an estimate for daily flows and holdings of
Treasury securities. This series is consistent with observed lower frequency measures
of purchases and holdings. The daily flows series is also consistent with daily data on
Japanese Ministry of Finance foreign exchange interventions, one of the only available
sources of raw daily flows data.
2Over most of the sample, the monthly series regarded as the most reliable would be the data
generated by Bertaut and Tryon (2007) using a simpler time series model and fewer observed data
series than I use in this paper. Since late 2011, the Treasury has collected monthly data on foreign
holdings which appears, based on evidence available to date, to be fairly accurate (Brandner, Cai,
and Judson (2012)).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the available
data on foreign purchases and holdings and the existing modifications. Section 3.3
presents the conceptual framework, the state space representation, and the estimation
technique for the new approach in this paper. Section 3.4 presents the results and
compares them to existing data and relevant benchmarks. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Raw Data and Existing Improvements
To provide context for the contribution of this paper and also to provide background
information on the data I will employ, I must now discuss the available data on
Treasury flows. After discussing the data and its shortcomings, I will provide a brief
overview of the existing methodology for improving the quality of the available data.
This methodology, from Bertaut and Tryon (2007), will serve as a useful benchmark
for the series which I estimate in this paper and is also the main measure of flows
with which my series competes.
3.2.1 Raw Measures of Treasury Flows
As suggested in the introduction, there are four imperfect measures of Treasury flows
available to analysts. There are annual and (recently) monthly measures of the stock
of foreign holdings, a monthly measure of transactions (ie, outright purchases only),
and a weekly measure of a subset of the stock of foreign holdings. The weekly series
comes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and all three lower frequency series are
from the TIC database.
The first series is an annual measure of the stock of foreign holdings of US Treasury
debt, which comes from the TIC survey of foreign holdings of US securities. This
series will be referred to henceforth as the “SHL” series based on the name of the
survey forms used in the collection of the data. The SHL series are published as a
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snapshot of the value of the stock of foreign holdings as of June 30th of each year (the
“survey date”). Preliminary results from the survey become available in the February
following the survey date and final results are published on April 30th following the
survey date, a delay of 10 months. The survey includes data on the breakdown of
Treasury holdings by investor type (official and private), by country, and by maturity.3
Both because the data is believed to be of high-quality (carefully collected at the level
of individual securities from custodians, issuers, and investors) and because no better
measure of the truth currently exists, analysts typically treat the SHL data as more
or less free of error. Clearly, the Form SHL stock data can be used to create a measure
of annual flows (the sum of outright purchases/sales and valuation flows) by taking
first differences.
A second series, available beginning only in late 2011, is a monthly measure of the
stock of foreign holdings from TIC Form SLT. It is similar to the annual measure of
the stock and is intended to improve the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy.
Based on available evidence, the SLT data appears to be of relatively high quality
and provides a similar characterization foreign purchases and holdings to the annual
SHL data, though some differences remain. As in the case of the annual stocks above,
these monthly stocks can be differenced to obtain monthly flows.
The third series is a monthly measure of net cross-border transactions (purchases
and sales only) measured by TIC Form S. Form S transactions are stated as the net,
monthly cross-border purchases and sales of securities at end-of-month prices. The
series only measures outright purchases (and not valuation changes) and only captures
transactions between US residents and foreign counterparties (that is, it excludes
transactions between only foreign counterparties). Form S data are desirable both
because of their higher frequency and because they available with a delay of only
about a month, making them the most timely data on flows available from TIC.
3It also includes similar data for several other asset classes: asset-backed securities, corporate
bonds, and equity.
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However, Form S transactions data cannot be easily accumulated into a measure
of stocks (and they are not directly comparable to Form SHL or SLT data) for a
couple of reasons. First of all, Form S data exclude valuation changes in the stock of
foreign holdings, so separately performing a valuation adjustment would be necessary
to make the series comparable and create monthly stock series from the Form S
data. Additionally, there are several sources of noise or error in the data, not all of
which are fully understood. At least one is that transactions costs are included in
the measure of transactions. Additionally, Bertaut and Tryon (2007) find evidence
of other, unknown errors.4 Given these problems, the monthly transactions data is
typically treated as very unreliable until it has been adjusted to be consistent with
annual Form SHL data (including the addition of valuation adjustments).5
The fourth and final measure foreign holdings comes from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and is published weekly in the Federal Reserve’s H4.1 release.
It is the dollar value of Treasury securities held custodially by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York for foreign official and international institutions. The data are
desirable due to their high frequency, timely release (with a delay of only one day),
and presumed accuracy. However, the custody holdings data cover only about 60%
to 75% of foreign official holdings of Treasury securities and entirely exclude private
holdings. For this reason, analysts typically discount the custody holdings data and
rarely use it in academic studies.
3.2.2 Existing Approach to Improving the Raw Data
Given the various sources of data, each with their own shortcomings, it is natural that
economists would develop a systematic approach to combining the different sources,
creating a hybrid series which exploits the advantages of the underlying raw series.
4For asset-backed securities, repayments of principal are ignored, also.
5The Form S data also exhibit severe biases in the breakdown of net purchases by country and
by investor type.
81
Thus far, the literature has focused on a single approach to generating an improved
measure of monthly stocks, based on two of the raw series discussed above: Form
SHL annual stock and Form S monthly transactions data, as well as Treasury pricing
data. This approach is best exemplified by Bertaut and Tryon (2007), though earlier
forms were presented in Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2004), Bertaut, Griever,
and Tryon (2006), and Warnock and Warnock (2009). The Bertaut and Tryon (BT)
method does not use Form SLT data because they were not available at the time and
excludes data from the New York Fed presumably due to the shortcomings discussed
the previous section.6 The BT data, available from the Federal Reserve, ends in June
2011, shortly before the TIC Form SLT data begins.
The BT method begins with the assumption that the annually observed SHL
stocks are accurate and then uses the monthly transactions data and Treasury pricing
data to extrapolate monthly stocks from one SHL survey date to the next. In practice,
this amounts to adding measured (Form S) transactions and the valuation change
(estimated using a standard index of Treasury prices) to the previous month’s stock.
The process is repeated each month, beginning from an SHL survey value, until the
next SHL survey date. Unsurprisingly, the resulting extrapolated monthly stock series
generally does not equal the next SHL stock measure. Since the latter is assumed
to be the truth, one must find a method for smoothing this gap over the previous
year’s flows (since the last observation of the truth in the form of an SHL survey),
although the observer does not know in which month the errors occurred. Bertaut and
Tryon model the resulting gap between extrapolated and SHL stocks, thought to arise
from errors in measuring the valuation changes, the inclusion of transactions costs in
reported transaction values, and other sources, as proportional to net transactions.
6Beltran, Kretchmer, Marquez, and Thomas (2013) adjust the BT series using confidential,
country-level data on the New York Fed’s custody holdings, but neither their adjustment technique
nor their data are publicly available.
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The resulting series can be written mathematically as
Ŝt = Ŝt−1(1 + π̂t) + N̂t + γtgapt, (3.1)
where hats denote series that are observed or extrapolated with the potential for
error. Ŝt is the value of the stock of foreign holdings at the end of month t, π̂t
is the percentage change in Treasury prices over month t (measured by a standard
price index), and N̂t is the value of monthly net transactions measured by the TIC
form S. The gap between the extrapolated and SHL stock is distributed over each
year using the weighting function γt. The weighting function is time-varying for two
reasons. First, the gap is distributed across months in proportion to each month’s
net transactions, which are of course time-varying. Second, the gap observed at the
annual frequency includes both observation errors in the monthly transactions data,
N̂t, and the valuation changes on those observation errors which accumulate between
the time of the monthly observation error and the annual observation of the gap.
The share of the annual gap attributed to any month must be valuation-adjusted to
account for the latter.
This method greatly improves the quality of available data on foreign holdings
or purchases, but has several shortcomings that I address in this paper. First, the
BT series only uses three sources of information to estimate the value of unobserved
foreign holdings: TIC Form SHL surveys, TIC Form S surveys, and Treasury pric-
ing data. In addition, the BT method uses Treasury pricing data only to perform a
simple accounting exercise to estimate valuation changes in the foreign portfolio. A
growing literature indicates that purchases of Treasuries have substantial impacts on
Treasury prices, so variation in Treasury prices may also contain information regard-
ing Treasury flows beyond the information that can be extracted by this accounting
exercise. My method allows for Treasury price changes to inform estimates of flows
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both through an accounting or valuation channel and through the price impact of
purchases on yields. My method also incorporates information from exchange rate
movements and the recently created TIC form SLT data. A second shortcoming of
the BT method is that it only generates monthly estimates of stocks or flows. For
many purposes, higher frequency data is desirable. A state space model and the
Kalman Filter provide a natural method to apply mixed frequency data, including
daily data, to estimate daily stocks and flows. Finally, the BT method is likely to
provide a noisier measure of flows than the truth because of the valuation adjustment
process. In Equation (3.1), Ŝt−1 includes the accumulation of Form S transactions
data, and the accompanying measurement errors, since the last SHL survey date.
Thus, the BT method effectively valuation adjusts the noise in the Form S series,
which should result in a noisier extrapolated flows or stocks series. It is worth noting
that this process will not affect flows or stocks over longer horizons, since the series
is constrained to match the SHL series. It is also worth noting that distributing the
extrapolation gap across months between surveys does not eliminate this noise, as
the gap reflects the accumulated errors from all twelve months between each SHL
survey, whereas the valuation adjustment process in any given month adjusts the
errors month-by-month.7 By employing a Kalman Filter, I remove this noise prior
to applying valuation adjustments. As expected, I obtain a series with slightly lower
variance. Third and finally, this paper applies a well-understood and more rigorous
time series model to estimate Treasury flows and reveals a few cases where previously
existing estimates of flows may have been misleading.
Having reviewed the sources of raw data and the existing techniques for improving
the data, I will now present my empirical approach.
7This problem could be more complicated if errors are allowed to exhibit serial correlation, but
both this paper and Bertaut and Tryon assume a serial correlation of zero.
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3.3 My Empirical Methodology
In this section, I present the conceptual framework behind my new measure of Trea-
sury flows, then present the data and model used to implement that framework em-
pirically.8
3.3.1 Conceptual Framework
To motivate the state space model discussed below and to fix ideas, consider a simple
conceptual framework for cross-border Treasury flows. There are (potentially) flows
on each US business day.9 On such days, total Treasury flows can be decomposed
into two parts: outright purchases/sales of Treasury securities (at current prices) by
foreigners and valuation changes in the stock of foreign holdings as a result of changes
in the market prices of Treasury securities. Mathematically,
ft = ot + vt, (3.2)
where ot are daily outright purchases/sales and vt are daily valuation changes. Loosely,
outright purchases are the current price multiplied by the daily change in the number
of securities held by foreigners and valuation changes are the quantity of securities
held by foreigners multiplied by the change in the price on that day. It is worth
noting that by this definition, daily flows, ft, are the same as the daily change in the
current value of the stock of foreign holdings of Treasury securities:
∆st = ft = ot + vt.
8Arouba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) use similar methods to generate high-frequency, real-time
estimates of real economic activity.
9For the purposes of this paper, US business days are defined to be every day for which the Federal
Reserve produces end-of-day Treasury yield data according to the methodology of Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Wright (2006). This definition yields a series of business days nearly identical to that from other
common definitions.
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This paper is primarily concerned with obtaining an estimate of daily flows, ft = ∆st,
though I will separately obtain ot and vt, and they may be of interest in their own
right.
While daily flows are themselves never observed, there are several related series
that are observed at various frequencies. Consider a generic series i observed on day
t and call it yit. This series can be expressed as a linear function of a constant, the











where I assume that uit ∼ iidN (0, σ2ui).
The series yit may not be observed every day, so denote the series observed at
lower frequency by ỹit. The expression for ỹ
i
t which is consistent with Equation (3.3)
will depend upon whether ỹit is a stock or a flow variable. If ỹ
i
t is a stock variable,
then it is just the value that yit takes on the day t on which it is observed. Thus, for
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where n is the number of days since the last observation of the flow. The error term
εit is the sum of the i.i.d. daily errors and is thus i.i.d. N (0, σ2εi), where σ2εi = nσ2ui .
I will cast these basic relationships in a state space form and extract measures
of daily outright purchases/sales (ot) and of daily valuation changes (vt) using the
Kalman Filter. The sum of these two series is daily Treasury flows, ft, which can
be accumulated to obtain stocks or flows at various frequency. The Kalman Filter is
well-suited to this task for at least two reasons. First, it is a well-understood time
series technique for obtaining unobserved or latent series from the variation in related,
observed series. This is precisely my goal in this paper. Second, the Kalman Filter
can easily accommodate the varying frequency of the observed data and the resulting
large number of missing observations. These benefits and the implementation of the
model will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Data and Measurement Equation Relationships
Before discussing the implementation of the state space model, I will discuss the data
and how I model it as a function of the unobserved components of flows. I use a total
of six time series related to Treasury flows from July 2002 through January 2014, all
of which, I will argue, are functions of either ot or vt. Three are daily series derived
from asset prices and three are lower-frequency measures of flows derived from the
TIC database. Those series are:
• Daily approximate valuation changes: v̂t. The daily change in the value
of foreign holdings of Treasury securities, vt, can be written as
vt = (%∆pt)st−1,
where pt is an index of the price of foreign-held Treasuries. I approximate




where I assume δmod is constant at 4.2, which is approximately the average
duration of the foreign portfolio over my sample period. Ideally, I would use
the exact duration on each day. However, the duration of the portfolio is never
observed. Only the breakdown of maturity into rough bins is ever observed,
and this observation only occurs once a year. In any event, the maturity struc-
ture, and thus probably the average duration of foreign holdings, appears to be
quite stable. For ∆it, I use the change in the five-year, smoothed, zero-coupon
Treasury yield from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006), as this is the closest
maturity to the average maturity of foreign holdings and fits the data best in
unreported regressions.
Finally, I must approximate st−1, as that is also not observed. Indeed, if it were
observed, this entire exercise would be unnecessary. I linearly interpolate the
SHL stocks at the daily frequency to produce an approximate daily stock series.
This approximation to the daily stock of foreign holdings allows my valuation
change measure to correctly capture the sharp upward trend in foreign holdings,
and thus in the volatility of daily valuation changes, over my sample period.
However, it does not take account of the relatively small impact of intra-year
deviations from this upward trend.
These assumptions give rise to an approximate daily valuation change series v̂t,
which I assume is equal to the true valuation change series vt:
v̂t = vt (3.6)
In principle, I should add an error term to Equation (3.6), resulting in the
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equation
v̂t = vt + ε
v
t .
However, doing so causes the Kalman Filter to attribute nearly all of the vari-
ation in the approximated valuation adjustment series, v̂t, to ε
v
t rather than to
actual valuation adjustments, vt. This is because the error term is unrestricted
while vt is constrained to satisfy summation constraints discussed below. Thus,
the filter assigns nearly all the variance from the observed left-hand-side to the
second of the two unobserved right-hand-side series, εvt . While it is surely the
case that there should be an error term with some small variance, I cannot know
what that variance should be. I argue that setting the variance of εvt to zero
is closer to the truth than the answer the Kalman Filter picks, which implies
that there are virtually no valuation changes. Thus, I use Equation (3.6) with
no error term.
• Daily five-year yield change: ∆i5,t. I include the daily change in the 5-
year Treasury yield as it may provide information on flows over and above the
information it provides in the valuation adjustment exercise described immedi-
ately above. There is a large and growing literature which suggests that foreign
Treasury purchases cause changes in Treasury yields or prices (see Warnock and
Warnock (2009), Beltran et al (2013), and Chapters 1 and 2 of this disserta-
tion). In short, Treasury purchases affect demand for US Treasury securities,
which affects their price and yield. Thus, changes in Treasury yields contain
information regarding purchases. Specifically, a decline in yields on any given
day might signal large foreign purchases of Treasuries and vice versa. Given the
findings of the above-mentioned literature, I model the change in the five-year
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yield as
∆i5,t = β1ot + ε
1
t , (3.7)
where ε1t ∼ N (0, σ2ε1).
While it may be desirable, in principle to include additional yields, I do not
because the majority of the variation in Treasury yields are level shifts that are
mostly common to all yields and because adding more yields only increases the
number of parameters to estimate. Given that five years is close to the average
maturity of foreign holdings over the sample period, it is the natural candidate
for the single yield to include in the model. Additionally, Chapters 1 and 2 find
that the impacts of purchases are largest on five-year yields.
• Daily log-changes in exchange rates: ∆ log(et). Given that many foreign
Treasury holdings are in the form of foreign exchange reserves, variation in
exchange rates should contain information on Treasury flows. Hence, I model
daily log-changes in the Federal Reserve’s broad dollar index as a function of
both outright purchases and valuation changes on the given day:
∆ log(et) = β2ot + β3vt + ε
2
t , (3.8)
where ε2 ∼ N (0, σ2ε2).
• Monthly Form S transactions: ˆ̃oSt . As discussed above, the TIC Form S
transactions are a noisy measure of outright purchases and sales, ot, over the








where nm is the number of business days in the month (which obviously varies
from month-to-month) and ε3t ∼ N (0, σ2ε3).
• Monthly Form SLT flows: ˆ̃fSLTt . The monthly TIC Form SLT survey pro-
vides a noisy measure of the stock foreign holdings at the end of each month, so











where ε4t ∼ N (0, σ2ε4). Unlike the other data series used, Form SLT flows data
are available only beginning with January 2012. The surveys were also taken
in October and December 2011, but January is the first consecutive month
in which the stocks were measured, which is necessary for measuring monthly
flows.
• Annual Form SHL flows: ˆ̃fSHLt . The annual SHL stock surveys yield mea-
sures of annual flows, in much the same manner that the SLT surveys measure
the stock at the monthly frequency. I model the SHL flows as the sum of both ot
and vt over the year, but I assume that the SHL flows are accurate, so there is no
error. This follows the literature on cross-border flows and reflects economists’
assessment of the quality of the data, discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2.1.








where ny is the number of trading days in the year, which varies year-to-year.
Note that, unlike in Equation (3.3), I do not include any exogenous explanatory
variables Xt in any of the relationships. While, in principle, I do want to control for
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other variables, particularly in the daily asset pricing relationships, I do not because
of data limitations. Most candidate control variables, such as inflation or economic
activity variables, are not observed at the daily frequency, and so their inclusion is
difficult and would, in any case, not induce day-to-day variation in asset prices.
These six relationships will form the measurement equation in the state space
model, which I will discuss next.
3.3.3 State Space Representation
In order to implement the Kalman Filter, I must cast the model in state space form.
Of course, the state space form consists of a measurement and a transition equation.
The measurement equation was rationalized one relationship at a time in the section
immediately above, so I will now rationalize the transition equation before formally
writing down the model.
I specify a standard transition equation, modeling the two unobserved components
of flows as autoregressive of lag order one. Given the apparent noisiness both of
monthly measures of outright purchases and of daily Treasury price changes (and
thus valuation changes), a more complicated lag structure does not appear necessary.
I assume the error terms of the AR(1) models are identically and independently
Gaussian.
These assumptions, together with Equations (3.6)-(3.11) from Section 3.3.2, yield
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a state space model comprised of a measurement equation given by













0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
β1 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
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and a transition equation given by

























































In both the measurement and transition equations, the vertical and horizontal
double lines correspond to the break between the 251st and 252nd column or row,
respectively. They divide the matrices and vectors into the components corresponding
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to the outright purchases series, ot, and the valuation change series, vt. There are 251
elements of each of the two series in the state vector αt because there are at most 251
trading days in a year, meaning that the SHL flows, ˆ̃fSHLt , are the sum of at most
the 251 most recent realizations of both ot and vt. Because some years have fewer
trading days, each sum may be comprised of fewer than 251 elements, hence the “1
or 0” entries on the last line of Zt. Similarly, the vertical lines in Zt mark the first 24
columns that correspond to either ot or vt, reflecting the fact that there are at most
24 trading days in any month in the sample. Again, some months have fewer than 24
trading days, giving rise to the “1 or 0” entries in the fourth and fifth rows.
As this discussion suggests, the measurement equation varies depending upon data
availability. If, on day t, some data series are not available, then the measurement
equation, (3.12), is replaced by
y∗t = Z
∗
t αt + ε
∗
t ,
where starred variables denote the base variable with any row corresponding to miss-
ing data deleted. So, for example, if day t is not the last day of any month, then
only daily data are observed, and so the measurement equation consists of only the
first three rows of Equation (3.12). If t is the last day of the month so that Form S
transactions are also observed, but neither the SLT or SHL data are observed, then
the measurement equation consists of the first four rows of Equation (3.12). The
transition equation is time-invariant.
Given the assumptions on the six scalar error terms, the vector errors can be
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described as εt ∼ iidN (0, Ht) and ηt ∼ iidN (0, Q), with
Ht =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2ε1 0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2ε2 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2ε3 0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2ε4 0






σ2η1 0 · · · 0
0 0
. . . 0 0251×251
...
. . . 0
...
0 0 · · · 0
σ2η2 0 · · · 0
0251×251 0 0
. . . 0
...
. . . 0
...




To this state space model, I apply standard Kalman filtering techniques, which are
discussed in greater detail in Harvey (1989) and Hamilton (1994). I will review them
here briefly for clarity and to explain the three different estimates of stocks and flows
which will be discussed in Section 3.4. The last of three estimates is not discussed by
Harvey or Hamilton and arises because I am interested in obtaining both flows and
stocks from the same state space model. I generate this third series as do Stock and
Watson (1989).
I begin with an initial guess for α at time one and the variance-covariance matrix
for α at time 1. Reflecting the fact that these initial guesses are not conditional on
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any data from the sample, these initial values are typically named α1|0 and P1|0.
10
Given these initial values, I produce the “filtered” estimates of αt and Pt, denoted
αt|t and Pt|t, by recursively applying the updating equations given by
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This filtering process yields a series of vectors αt|t for each date t in the sample. On
any given date t, the filtered estimate αt|t is a vector containing both components of
Treasury flows on date t (and the previous 250 days) conditional on all data as of
date t.
The filtered estimates are of little independent interest because using αt|t to gen-
erate measures of flows and stocks mixes information sets. To see this, note that one
might take the daily flows on each day t conditional on the information available as
of that day to arrive at “filtered flows.” Accumulating these filtered flows yields the
“filtered stock.” The filtered stock, which I will denote st|t,t−1,..., is given by
st|t,t−1,... = ft|t + ft−1|t−1 + ft−2|t−2 + . . . f1|1 + s0.
10For the results in this paper, I follow convention and choose α1|0 to be a vector of zeros and P1|0
to be a diagonal matrix with all diagonal elements equal to 1,000, but the results are not sensitive
to this choice.
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This filtered stock variable is undesirable because it is the accumulation of each
day’s flow, where each one is conditional on a different information set. Because of
this difficulty in accumulating the filtered stock, I will introduce a new series, the
“iteratively smoothed” flows and stocks shortly.
In any event, I take the filtered estimates of αt|t and Pt|t, run the Kalman smoother,
and produce the “smoothed” estimates, denoted αt|T and Pt|T . These smoothed esti-
mates are produced by recursively applying the smoothing equations given by
αt|T = αt|t + Pt|tT
′P−1t+1|t(αt+1|T − Tαt|t)




beginning with the last filtered α and P , αT |T and PT |T . This smoothing process
produces the smoothed flows and stocks in much the same way as the filter does,
except that all estimates are conditional on the same information set: the full sample
(hence the t|T subscript).
To address the issue of inconsistency in the information set with the filtered stock
series, I also generate an iteratively smoothed series for both flows and stocks (Stock
and Watson (1989)). These series are produced by running the Kalman smoother
beginning at each date t. Of course, the iteratively smoothed series and the smoothed
series will be identical at time t = T. This process of iterative smoothing produces,
at date t, an estimate of all flows from time 0 to t conditional on the information set
at time t. By accumulating these iteratively smoothed flows, I arrive at an estimate
of the stock conditional on information at time t, called st|t, and expressed as
st|t = ft|t + ft−1|t + ft−2|t + . . . f1|t + s0.
This notion of the stock of foreign holdings is conditional on only the current in-
formation set, and thus overcomes the inconsistency inherent in the filtered series.
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Note, however, that changes in the iteratively smoothed stock from time t to t + 1
will reflect both the estimate of flows on date t+ 1 and revisions to the estimates of
history based on the new data that arrives at t+ 1:
st+1|t+1 − st|t = ft+1|t+1 + (st|t+1 − st|t).
On most days, the changes in the information set are small and so this distinction is
irrelevant, but on days when annual SHL surveys arrive, the revisions of history can
be substantial. These large revisions reflect the fact that the annual surveys contain
a great deal of information.
Finally, I must discuss the estimation of the eleven unknown parameters in Zt,
Ht, T , and Q. Up to this point in discussing the Kalman filter, I have assumed that
these parameters are known, but of course they are not. I estimate the parameters












In this section I will discuss the results, focusing first on the behavior of the series
that I estimate, then comparing these series to the existing raw data and the BT
data. In short, the smoothed estimate of flows behaves quite reasonably, though the
daily outright purchases series may vary less than one would expect, perhaps owing
to problems of econometric identification. My smoothed estimates also behave well
in relation to other measures of flows, appearing less noisy than the Form S and
BT series. My results suggest that both the BT series and the newer Form SLT
series are fairly accurate measures of monthly flows, though there are a few notable
discrepancies between our series. Form SLT data appear to estimate substantially
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different valuation changes on a couple of occasions.
3.4.1 Estimated Latent Series
The smoothed estimates of cross-border Treasury flows and stocks appear reasonable
on the basis of existing data. While we obviously cannot observe true flows or stocks,
and thus cannot know how far the smoothed series are from the truth, they would
appear quite close. Figure 3.1 depicts several measures of flows and Figure 3.2 depicts
the corresponding stocks, both at the monthly frequency. The smoothed flows and
stocks are, by construction, consistent with the annual SHL surveys of the stock of
foreign holdings, believed to be the most accurate source of data on such holdings.
The series reflect the general intra-year trends measured by the Form S surveys,
but of course the Form S surveys do not include valuation adjustments. Figure 3.2
shows that the stocks of foreign holdings implied by accumulating Form S transactions
forward from the most recent survey are very inaccurate. This inaccuracy reflects both
a lack of valuation adjustments and also apparent error in the measured transactions
or outright purchases. See Bertaut and Tryon (2007) for a more complete discussion of
these issues with the TIC data. Both smoothed series conform well with the Bertaut
and Tryon data, as well as with the TIC Form SLT data.
Examining the iteratively smoothed flows series in Figure 3.3, it is clear that the
annual SHL surveys contain a great deal of information. This is partly due to the
fact I have assumed that the SHL data is accurate, which itself reflects my (and the
profession’s) belief that the SHL data contain a great deal of information. Recall that
the iteratively smoothed flows can be expressed as
st+1|t+1 − st|t = ft+1|t+1 + (st|t+1 − st|t).
The months in which the iteratively smoothed series deviates substantially from the
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Figure 3.1: Cross-Border Treasury Flows at the Monthly Frequency by Various Mea-
sures. The plot shows smoothed flows, TIC Form S transactions, TIC Form SLT
flows, and Bertaut-Tryon flows.
smoothed series are months in which the SHL survey is realized and the revisions
to the assessment of daily flows over the past year (or the stock as of yesterday, the
second term in the expression) are substantial. The picture is intuitively similar,
though a bit more dramatic at the daily frequency, as the large revisions to history
occur on individual days.
3.4.2 Behavior of Subcomponents of Flows
The subcomponents of Treasury flows, smoothed outright purchases, ot, and valuation
flows, vt, generally behave as one might expect. The smoothed outright purchases
series suggests that foreigners very rarely sell Treasuries back to American investors,
but valuation flows regularly cause declines the value of foreign holdings of Treasuries.
Nonetheless, both outright purchases, ot, and valuation adjustments, vt, induce sub-
stantial variability in Treasury flows at the monthly frequency (Figure 3.4). At the
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Figure 3.2: Stock of Foreign Treasury Holdings at the Monthly Frequency by Various
Measures. The plot shows smoothed, TIC Form S transactions accumulated forward
from most recent SHL stock survey, TIC Form SLT, Bertaut-Tryon, and TIC Form
SHL.
Figure 3.3: Cross-Border Treasury Flows at the Monthly Frequency, Smoothed and
Iteratively Smoothed.
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daily frequency, outright purchases are relatively smooth and valuation changes more
volatile. Because outright purchases are persistent at the daily frequency, they still
contribute meaningfully to monthly variation.
Assessing the plausibility of the valuation adjustment series at both the daily and
monthly frequencies is straightforward and the series appear sensible. Given that we
periodically observe the approximate duration of foreign holdings and we observe the
daily changes in Treasury yields, we have a good idea of how valuation adjustments
should behave at both frequencies. Indeed, the valuation change series is just the
approximation based on duration and the five-year yield. The dramatic rise in the
volatility of valuation adjustments in 2007 and 2008 reflects a combination of greater
Treasury price volatility and larger foreign holdings of Treasuries (which would imply
larger dollar changes in valuation for a given yield or price change).
Assessing the plausibility of outright purchases is more difficult, but the series also
appear sensible. At the monthly frequency, we observe a noisy measure of outright
purchases in the Form the TIC S survey. Figure 3.6 shows both outright purchases and
the Form S transactions data. The outright purchases series is similar to the Form S
series, though with the noise dampened, as the prior beliefs of analysts would suggest.
Where the outright purchases series deviates from this baseline, it generally does so
to maintain consistency with other measures of flows. For example, in between July
2012 and June 2013, Form S data substantially understated flows (as measured by the
SHL data; see Figure 3.2) and did so to an extent greater than can be explained by
valuation changes missing from the Form S data. Therefore, the outright purchases
series generally exceeds the transactions data over the period. One notable deviation
of the two series is in December 2013, when outright purchases are far higher than the
transactions data. The smoothed total Treasury flows series is also higher than Form
SLT data in December (Figure 3.8), though to a less dramatic extent. December was
a month in which short yields rose significantly relative to the 5-year yield, suggesting
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Figure 3.4: Monthly Smoothed Outright Purchases, õt|T , and Valuation Adjustments,
ṽt|T .
the true capital loss on the foreign portfolio might be larger than I estimate, so that
my valuation change might be overstated. However, it is unclear why an overstated
valuation change would lead to overly positive outright purchases.
Data from the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) provide a rare measure of daily
purchases, which I use to confirm to the plausibility of the daily outright purchases
series. Figure 3.7 shows daily smoothed outright purchases and MOF dollar purchases
in 2003 and 2004, a period in which the MOF was especially active in foreign exchange
markets. While the MOF purchases are often much larger than outright purchases
on a given day, this is not a problem. First of all, the only series we observe at
the daily frequency from the MOF are their dollar purchases, and these dollars were
either invested in dollar deposit accounts or dollar securities. Further, not all of the
securities were Treasuries and the breakdown by security type is unknown, though
officials at the time indicated that the majority of their dollar securities holdings
were Treasuries. Thus, the large MOF purchases on any given day might be invested
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Figure 3.5: Daily Smoothed Outright Purchases, ot|T , and Valuation Adjustments,
vt|T .
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Figure 3.6: Smoothed Outright Purchases, õt|T , and TIC Form S Transactions at the
Monthly Frequency.
primarily in deposit accounts, resulting in smoother Treasury purchases (like the
smoothed outright purchases series). This assertion is supported both by the MOF’s
stated policy of only gradually buying Treasuries to avoid causing market disruptions
and by monthly data on the composition of MOF purchases in terms of deposits
and securities. This data indicates that the MOF in fact did smooth their Treasury
purchases relative to their foreign exchange interventions by depositing a large share
of the dollars in deposit accounts, even at the monthly frequency. For example, about
half of the dollars the MOF purchased between September 2003 and January 2004
were placed in deposit accounts. These deposit accounts were gradually reinvested
in securities (presumably mostly Treasuries) through August 2004, even after dollar
purchases ended in March 2004 (see Abe (2007) for more detail on this period). So,
the persistent daily purchases of around $2 billion of Treasuries from late 2003 through
July and August of 2004 (as implied by the smoothed purchases series) are consistent
with what data is available on daily foreign Treasury purchases. Thus, while it is
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Figure 3.7: Daily Smoothed Outright Purchases and Japanese Ministry of Finance
Purchases of USD. Data on Japanese purchases, denominated in yen, are available
from the Bank of Japan. Purchases are converted to dollars using the daily nominal
exchange rate, available from the Federal Reserve.
of course impossible to verify the accuracy of any one day’s Treasury purchases, the
daily outright purchases series appears reasonable.
3.4.3 Comparing Smoothed Flows with Existing Measures of
Flows
As Figures 3.8 and 3.9 indicate, the smoothed flows series behaves well with respect
to other monthly measures of flows. The series tend to move in similar fashions,
and, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, my flows series exhibits slightly lower variance
than the BT series. The BT data has a standard deviation of 33.3 while my series
has a standard deviation of 31.3. As discussed previously, one might expect the BT
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series to exhibit too much variation, as they include valuation adjustments on the
accumulation of noisy measures of outright purchases. Thus, the BT series includes
“valuation adjusted noise,” while my series should not, as the Kalman filter strips
out this noise.
Nonetheless, there are a few cases where the series diverge from one another no-
tably. For example, in November 2012, the smoothed and SLT series deviate notice-
ably, and it appears to arise mechanically because my smoothed outright purchases
series substantially exceeds the Form S transactions. My smoothed series exceeds
Form S transactions for most of that year, reflecting the fact that the Form SHL data
and valuation changes suggest that the Form S series understated purchases over the
period. To the extent that the Form S and SLT data are consistent with one another,
they will both differ from my series. In any event, in the following month, SLT flows
are substantially below my smoothed series, largely making up the difference. As
another example, as noted above, the smoothed flows and SLT flows deviate substan-
tially in December 2013, when short yields rose relative to 5-year yields. Because my
valuation adjustment methodology relies exclusively on 5-year yields, it may be un-
derstating the capital losses on foreign holdings and thus overstating valuation flows.
However, Figure 3.6 also shows that the smoothed outright purchases significantly ex-
ceed the Form S transactions. As noted in Section 3.4.2, the reason for this is unclear.
A final episode of interest is the largely offsetting deviations of the smoothed and BT
series in April and May 2009. This discrepancy is driven by the differing treatments
of the noisy Form S transactions data between my method and the BT method. The
Form S data show an unusually sharp swing from substantial net sales to substantial
net purchases in April and May, respectively. This large swing feeds directly in the
BT estimates, while the Kalman Filter interprets much of that variation as noise and
smooths it out. As a result, this is the most striking episode in which the BT series
exhibits more volatility than my series.
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Figure 3.8: Cross-Border Treasury Flows at the Monthly Frequency, Smoothed and
TIC Form SLT.




Finally, Table 3.1 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the eleven coefficients
of the model. All are statistically significant, reflecting the large sample size of daily
data used to estimate such a small number of parameters. The coefficients on yield
changes and log exchange rate changes, β1, β3, and β3, are smaller than might be
expected, probably because of remaining problems with econometric identification.
Particularly in the case of Treasury yields, it is difficult to disentangle the direction
of causality between yield changes and flows/purchases, since these are essentially
measures of price and quantity. As such, simultaneity issues arise which bias coeffi-
cient estimates toward zero. See the first two chapters of this dissertation for more

























Table 3.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model Coefficients. Asymptotic stan-




This paper applies Kalman Filtering techniques to produce a new measure of cross-
border Treasury flows using information from a larger number of data sources than
have previously been used. The resulting series overcomes the widely known short-
comings of existing raw data and provides an alternative to the benchmark Bertaut
and Tryon (2007) method for improving the data. I improve existing estimates of
flows along two major dimensions. First of all, I provide estimates of flows which
appear accurate even between high-quality annual surveys. Traditionally, raw data
on Treasury flows has been viewed as very inaccurate, and competing sources of infor-
mation conflict. The only previous solution for overcoming this inaccuracy produced
a low-frequency (monthly) series which was based on a relatively limited information
set and did not completely treat the noisy nature of the raw data. Second, I produce
daily estimates of flows which appear plausible on the basis of economic intuition and
what little was previously known about daily flows.
These data are useful for use by economists, both in academic research and policy
analysis. While more accurate data is clearly and generally important, the daily
flows series would be especially useful for use in high-frequency research such as
event studies. Additionally, my results shed light on the accuracy of the relatively
new Form SLT data from the US Treasury, suggesting that on a least one occasion,
the SLT data was at odds with combined implications of other measures of flows.
Future research should address two remaining issues with the methodology of this
paper. First, a wider measure of Treasury prices should, in principle, improve upon
the estimates of valuation adjustments in this paper. While the precise nature of
the valuation adjustment technique seems to make little difference most of the time,
the discussion above highlighted at least one instance where unusual Treasury pricing
behavior may have led my estimates of flows to deviate from other estimates. Second,
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a robust identification scheme for the impact of purchases on yields and exchange rates
would improve the information that the model can take from yield and exchange rate
movements. Ultimately, this paper moves economists one step closer to observing true




• July 21, 2005, 0600 CDT. The PBOC announced that it was discontinuously
appreciating the RMB versus the dollar by 2.1%. It also specified that the
exchange rate would be allowed to float in a narrow range around the PBOC’s
target, and said that the target would be allowed to vary with an incompletely
explained basket of currencies. The announcement was posted to the PBOC’s
website.
• July 26, 2005, 0330 CDT. A report was posted to the PBOC website down-
playing the possibility of future appreciation of the RMB. The report was re-
leased in answer to market speculation that the initial policy shift meant more
appreciation was soon to come. It clarified that the “gradualism” referred to
in prior statements was intended to describe the reform of the RMB exchange
rate regime, not necessarily quantitative changes in the exchange rate itself.
• September 9, 2005, 1305 CDT. A question and answer transcript from an
interview of PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan by a Chinese reporter was posted
to the PBOC’s website in which the governor indicated that the RMB would
continue to gradually appreciate.
• November 25, 2005, 0610 CDT. The PBOC entered into a 12-month cur-
rency swap agreement with several state banks. The exchange rate on the
12-month swap was interpreted by the market as an indication of the exchange
rate the PBOC expected to prevail in 12 months. The swap appears to have
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been mentioned earlier, but the details of the swap, including the exchange rate,
do not appear to have been released previously.
• January 5, 2006, 0605 CST. The director of the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages China’s foreign exchange reserves,
released a statement on SAFE’s website suggesting that the administration
intended to diversify its foreign currency holdings. Market participants inter-
preted the statement to mean that Chinese authorities intended to buy fewer
dollars and dollar-denominated assets going forward.
• November 10, 2006, 1450 CST. Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the PBOC,
told a reporter at a conference in Germany that the PBOC had no intention of
selling any currencies, a statement that was intended to (and did) tell market
participants that the PBOC planned to continue buying and holding dollars
and dollar-denominated assets.
• January 20, 2007, 0445 CST. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in a speech
that China was looking for new ways to manage its foreign exchange reserves.
Market participants, who were highly sensitive to indications about China’s
intentions regarding the US dollar, interpreted the statement to mean Chinese
authorities were considering diversifying out of US dollars.
• March 8, 2007, 2155 CST. Chinese Minister of Finance Jin Renqing con-
firmed previous speculation that Chinese authorities were planning to establish
a second investment company which would take some of the foreign exchange
reserves managed by SAFE and invest them with a goal of higher returns. Given
that SAFE maintained the investments primarily in safe, low-return assets and
especially in US Treasuries, market participants interpreted this to mean that
authorities intended to diversify away from Treasury securities.
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• March 15, 2007, 2235 CDT. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the
previously announced plans to create a new, higher-return investment company
for foreign exchange reserves would be carried out so as to avoid affecting dollar-
assets. This led market participants to expect larger Treasury holdings by China
going forward.
• March 20, 2007, 2150 CST. An article was published summarizing an inter-
view that day with PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. In it, the governor said
that China did not intend to continue accumulating foreign exchange reserves.
Taken at face value, this statement led participants to expect fewer Treasury
purchases going forward. On the other hand, it was fairly quickly dismissed as
a mistake or mistranslation.
• November 6, 2007, 2120 CST. The vice chairman of a Chinese government
advisory body suggested that China should consider the value of currencies it
purchased for foreign exchange reserves, suggesting a stronger euro might be a
better currency to hold than a weaker dollar. This suggested that China may
buy fewer dollars, but was a comment by a lesser official.
• July 27, 2008, 0600 CDT. In a statement released on its website after a quar-
terly monetary policy meeting, the PBOC said it aimed for policies to improve
growth and also removed by-then-standard language describing its exchange
rate mechanism as being market driven. Market participants interpreted this
to mean that RMB appreciation was likely to slow going forward. As it turns
out, this was the beginning of a nearly two year hold in the appreciation of the
RMB.
• March 23, 2009, 0210 CDT. The deputy governor of the PBOC, Hu Xiaolian,
told a reporter that China intended to continue buying Treasuries and that
they were an important part of China’s foreign exchange reserves. The press
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conference occurred several hours earlier than 0210 CDT, but no earlier mention
of the deputy governor’s comments appeared on Bloomberg.
• March 23, 2009, 0445 CDT. An essay by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan was
posted to the PBOC’s website which stressed the need for a super-sovereign
reserve currency. Market participants interpreted this to mean that the PBOC
wanted an alternative to holding dollars. The release has since been removed
from the PBOC’s website, so the time is taken from the first Bloomberg article
about the release.
• June 26, 2009, 0450 CDT. In its annual report on financial stability, the
PBOC called for the creation of a super-sovereign reserve currency. This was
interpreted by market participants as the PBOC officially taking the position ex-
pressed individually by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan in a March essay (see above).
It reaffirmed the PBOC’s desire for an alternative to the dollar. This release was
also removed from the PBOC’s website, so the timing is again from Bloomberg.
• March 8, 2010, 2020 CST. At a news conference, SAFE’s Director Yi Gang
reassured investors about China’s Treasury purchases, saying that such pur-
chases were mutually beneficial and indicating China intended to continue pur-
chasing them. He also said China did not plan to diversify its holdings into
gold. There were widespread recommendations at the time that China diversify
away from dollar-assets.
• April 8, 2010, 0355 CDT. The New York Times reported that China was
about to announce a change in its exchange rate policy. Given that it had main-
tained a nearly stable exchange rate since July, 27, 2008, market participants
interpreted this to mean that the PBOC would allow a new round of RMB
appreciation. The time is from a mention of the article on Bloomberg, as the
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earliest timestamp on the NYT ’s site is 0412 CDT. The story, which turned out
to be several months too early, was apparently leaked just before publication.
• April 12, 2010, 1955 CDT. An article was published on Bloomberg sum-
marizing a Xinhua article, published shortly before, discussing remarks made
by Chinese President Hu Jintao to US President Barack Obama. President Hu
remarked that China would choose the yuan’s exchange rate for its own pur-
poses, regardless of international pressure to do differently. He also commented
that yuan appreciation would not resolve bilateral trade imbalances. Since he
rarely remarked on currency matters, this was interpreted to mean China did
not intend to allow much appreciation of the RMB over the near-term. The
timing of the earlier Xinhua article could be determined, so the time is from
Bloomberg.
• May 10, 2010, 2015 CDT. The PBOC posted its quarterly Monetary Policy
Report on its website at 0430 CDT. The report contained a change in language
suggesting that the PBOC intended to resume the appreciation of the RMB. The
first mention of the new language Bloomberg was at 0716 CDT in reference to
a note from Morgan Stanley. Wider discussion of the change in language is not
seen on Bloomberg until 2015 CDT, following a China Business News article
in which a PBOC adviser interpreted the language change to indicate future
appreciation.
• May 27, 2010, 0210 CDT. SAFE posted on its website a rebuttal to a
Financial Times editorial piece. SAFE denied allegations that it planned to
shed some of its eurozone debt holdings. Market participants interpreted this
to mean SAFE did not plan to shift toward dollar-assets.
• June 19, 2010, 0600 CDT. The PBOC posted a release to its website stating
that it would resume RMB appreciation. The value of the RMB had been held
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roughly constant since July 2008.
• July 3, 2010, 0305 CDT. Hu Xiaolian, a vice governor of the PBOC, said
that exchange rate fluctuations were bad for China and that a country’s current
account balance is a good indication of whether a country’s currency is at its
equilibrium value. Since she also said that China’s current account was nearing
balance, these remarks were taken jointly to mean that the PBOC would likely
not allow the RMB to appreciate rapidly over the near-term.
• March 14, 2011, 2250 CDT. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said that
Chinese authorities would continue to allow the RMB to appreciate gradually,
partly to help control inflation.
• October 11, 2011, 2040 CDT. In a post on it website (which has since
been removed), the PBOC refuted a bill just passed by the US Senate targeting
China as a currency manipulator. In the post, the PBOC stated that it viewed
the foreign exchange value of its currency as “reasonable” and that they would
continue “gradual” currency reform. Based on discussion in the press, market
participants appear to have taken this as news suggesting greater-than-expected
appreciation of the RMB going forward.
• February 3, 2012, 0305 CST. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao made the
strongest statements to date suggesting China was considering using its foreign
exchange reserves to help address the eurozone debt crisis, both by supporting
the IMF and through unilateral action. Should China use its reserves in this
manner, it would likely require shifting some reserves out of dollar-denominated
assets and Treasuries.
• March 6, 2012, 0335 CST. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal
first published at the event time, Executive Vice President Wang Jiangxi of the
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China Investment Corporation (CIC) said that CIC had recently had its assets
boosted by $30 billion transferred from SAFE and that CIC was working on a
system that would allow CIC to grow steadily. Since CIC is an organization
that manages the riskier, more diversified segment of Chinese foreign exchange
reserves, this announcement would suggest fewer Treasury purchases should be
expected.
• March 11, 2012, 2245 CDT. At an annual press conference, PBOC Governor
Zhou Xiaochuan and other officials hinted that they believed the RMB was near
its equilibrium level, which most market participants appear to have interpreted
as suggesting a weaker-than-expected RMB going forward.
• August 30, 2012, 0010 CDT. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, after
meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, reiterated China’s willingness
to invest in the European bond market, suggesting continuing euro purchases
by Chinese official institutions and correspondingly fewer dollar and Treasury
purchases.
• May 6, 2013, 0605 CDT. In a statement regarding a meeting of the Chinese
State Council, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made unusually specific remarks
about plans to imminently liberalize RMB trading and make the currency fully
convertible. Given the specificity of the remarks, market participants took this
as a sign that the PBOC would allow the currency to appreciate further.
• November 19, 2013, 0210 CST. In a book released in conjunction with
a Communist Party meeting, PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan stated the
PBOC’s intentions to “basically” stop intervening in the foreign exchange mar-
kets routinely. While most of the remarks on the matter were repetition of
earlier statements, they were viewed as more credible, as the Chinese president
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and finance minister also contributed to and edited the book. These statements
suggested further appreciation of the RMB.
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Litterman, Robert and José Scheinkman (1991): “Common Factors Affect-
ing Bond Returns,” Journal of Fixed Income, June, pp. 54-61.
McCauley, Robert and Guorong Jiang (2004): “Treasury Yields and Foreign
Official Holdings of US Bonds,” Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review
(March).
Modigliani, Franco and Richard Sutch (1966): “Innovations in interest Rate
124
Policy,” American Economic Review Vol. 56(1/2), pp. 178-197.
Papaioannou, Elias, Richard Portes, and Gregorios Siourounis (2006): “Op-
timal Currency Shares in International Reserves: The Impact of the Euro and the
Prospects for the Dollar,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol.
20(4), pp. 508-547.
Reinhart, Vincent and Brian Sack (2000): “The Economic Consequences of Dis-
appearing Government Debt,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2000(2),
pp. 215-287.
Rigobon, Roberto (2003): “Identification Through Heteroskedasticity,” The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics Vol. 85(4), pp. 777-792.
— and Brian Sack (2003): “Measuring the Reaction of Monetary Policy to the
Stock Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 118(2), pp. 639-669.
— and — (2004): “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices,” Journal
of Monetary Economics Vol. 51(8), pp. 1553-1575.
— and — (2005): “The Effects of War Risk on US Financial Markets,” Jour-
nal of Banking & Finance Vol. 29(7), pp. 1769-1789.
Rubio-Ramı́rez, Juan F., Daniel F. Waggoner, and Tao Zha (2010): “Struc-
tural Vector Autoregressions: Theory of Identification and Algorithms for Inference,”
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 77, pp. 665-696.
Rudebusch, Glenn D., Eric T. Swanson, and Tao Wu (2006): “The Bond
Yield ‘Conundrum’ from a Macro-Finance Perspective,” Monetary and Economic
Studies Special Edition.
Setser, Brad W. and Arpana Pandey (2009): “China’s $1.5 Trillion Bet: Un-
derstanding China’s External Portfolio,” Council on Foreign Relations Center for
Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper.
Sierra, Jesus (2010): “International Capital Flows and Bond Risk Premia,” Bank
of Canada Working Paper No. 10-14.
Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson (1989): “New Indexes of Coincident
and Leading Economic Indicators,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume
4, ed. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, MIT Press.
Swanson, Eric T. (2011): “Let’s Twist Again: A High-Frequency Event-Study
Analysis of Operation Twist and Its Implications for QE2,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 151-207.
125
Thomas, Charles P., Francis E. Warnock, and Jon Wongswan (2004): “The
Performance of International Portfolios,” Federal Reserve Board International Fi-
nance Discussion Paper No. 817.
Uhlig, Harald (2005): “What Are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Output? Re-
sults from an Agnostic Identification Procedure,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
Vol. 52, pp. 381-419.
US Department of the Treasury Office of International Affairs (2014): “Re-
port to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” April 15.
Vayanos, Dimitri and Jean-Luc Vila (2009): “A Preferred-Habitat Model of
the Term Structure of Interest Rates,” NBER Working Paper No. 15487.
Warnock, Francis E. (2010): “How Dangerous Is US Government Debt? The
Risks of a Sudden Spike in US Interest Rates,” in Capital Flows Quarterly, 2010 Q2,
Council on Foreign Relations.
— and Veronica Cacdac Warnock (2009): “International Capital Flows and
US Interest Rates,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 903-
919.
Wright, Jonathan H. (2012): “What Does Monetary Policy Do To Long-Term
Interest Rates at the Zero Lower Bound?” Economic Journal, Vol. 122, pp. 447-466.
Zeng, Min (2014): “Big Drop in Foreigners’ Treasury Holdings at Fed Stirs Talk,”




Christopher A. Martin was born on August 2, 1986 in Columbia, Maryland. He
received a B.A. degree in Economics from McDaniel College of Westminster, Maryland
in 2008. He enrolled in the Ph.D. in Economics program at Johns Hopkins University
in 2008.
127
